In an effort to isolate Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, most European leaders ceased all contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
French President Emmanuel Macron was among the few who tried diplomacy early on, but his outreach failed to dissuade Putin, and the pair's meeting across an infamously long table became a source of mockery and symbol of Putin's unwillingness to engage with Europe.
Now, more than four years into a conflict that has lasted longer than World War 1 and become an existential challenge to European security, that policy of diplomatic isolation is starting to crack. With U.S.-led negotiations yielding no results, European capitals are weighing whether direct engagement with Moscow has become unavoidable.
In May, talks began over who should serve as Europe's special envoy to Russia. EU policy chief Kaja Kallas, former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi and former German chancellor Angela Merkel have all been floated as picks for the job, though discussions have remained speculative.
Finally, last month, after three ambassadors from France, the United Kingdom and Germany reportedly met with Russia's deputy foreign minister in Moscow, a member of European Council President António Costa’s cabinet reached out to the Kremlin.
But for Natia Seskuria, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, the question isn't whether Europe should claim a seat at the table, but when.
"The economic costs are growing, but they [the Russians] still have options," said Seskuria, an expert in Russia's domestic and foreign policy. "Right now they wouldn't stop the war." Instead, she argued, "the next round of negotiations will happen once Russia will feel that it doesn't have the battlefield advantage in Ukraine."
There are clear signs that Brussels is seeking a greater role in negotiations with Moscow, as Washington's efforts to end the war have stalled and the U.S. is focusing on the war in Iran. How do you see that shift unfolding?
I'm quite skeptical about the prospects of this kind of negotiations between Russia and the EU or any kind of EU-mediated negotiations, because the U.S. has clearly pointed out that it sees itself as the key player. I don't think that this will change, or that the EU will try to challenge the U.S. They obviously do not want to upset Trump. From the Russian perspective, I think there was a clear indication that they have seen speaking with the U.S. directly as an opportunity. While Putin thinks that with the U.S. he may have some space for maneuvering, the EU has been much more coherent when it comes to supporting Ukraine.
Unless there is some indication that the EU is willing to ease the sanctions in exchange for negotiations, I don't think that Putin would be willing to speak to the Europeans.
And at the same time, Washington's attempt to deliver a quick peace deal has hit a dead end.
I absolutely agree. The negotiations were doomed right from the very beginning. And even if Trump will continue to mediate, I don't really think that he will get anywhere. The main variable is whether Ukraine can sustain the momentum of its ongoing offensive and whether Russia comes under significant economic, political and domestic pressure. If that happens, Moscow may become more open to negotiations.
That, in turn, could create an opportunity for the West to use its leverage to bring Russia to the negotiating table with a more pragmatic approach, rather than one based on maximalist demands. The best scenario in this case would be for Europe and for the U.S. to act coherently. It wasn't the right approach to keep these negotiations confined to Putin and Trump because, ultimately, Europe has the greatest stake in the outcome of the conflict.
Some experts say that, even if Moscow wanted to end the war, the situation doesn't allow it. Would you agree?
Right now, they wouldn't stop the war, because it's still not clear that Ukraine can change the battlefield situation. Secondly, how do you justify it to the public? Ukraine has been undermining the image that Putin has been creating and, most importantly, hitting the most vulnerable areas, such as Crimea, which has been a symbol of Russian victory. Against that backdrop, it would be very hard for Putin to suddenly stop the war and sell it as a victory.
One of the options to change the battlefield situation in Russia's favor is highly controversial, but it's still something that is on the table: mass mobilization.
Can you recall instances in the past when European diplomats successfully stood up to Russia?
In terms of conflict negotiations, there was Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008 when he negotiated the peace plan with the Russians during the war with Georgia.
Then, of course, there were the Minsk formats after 2014. I don't really think that either can be treated as successful examples of a diplomatic settlement, because these conflicts are far from being over and Russia has violated the peace plan that has been negotiated. We can't just blame it on European leaders. The core of the problem is that Putin is not a fair negotiator, and he can change his positioning based on what Russia's current military aims and circumstances are. That's why Ukraine has been pushing so hard on having the security guarantees in place and then solving the conflict through diplomatic means. Kyiv understands that anything that Putin signs up to can be reversed in a minute.
Would Russia risk breaking its word to the U.S.?
Easily, because they have done so in the past. The main thing is: what is the deterrence on the other end? What we know so far is that when there is no deterrence, Russia is very much flexible to these negotiations and any deals that they sign. They know that they can overturn them. They know that there won't be any public pressure. They can always come up with the reasons why the other side is guilty.
For example, even though they have been testing NATO's unity, they have never really crossed the boundary of violating Article 5 directly. When there is a deterrence, Russia is not completely reckless. But when it comes to neighbors that are ultimately smaller and weaker, there is a very strong track record of Russia violating these negotiations. After 2014, there were some sanctions in place, but they have ultimately never really damaged the Russian economy to the extent that the risk of any other escalation was so high that Russia would never try to test the boundaries.
Beyond strengthening Ukraine's position on the battlefield, what more can the EU do to bolster its own leverage?
There are a lot of discussions behind the scenes of how, when, and in what terms, any sort of easing of the sanctions should happen, in case of negotiations. How to re-engage with Russia. But these discussions are useless if there is no way out of this conflict that guarantees Ukraine's security and, ultimately, Europe's security. And any sort of easing of policies that are in place needs to be treated in very careful terms.
What we know based on history and based on the previous rounds of negotiations is that, the stronger your position is with Russia, the more you can get out of the negotiations. When Russia feels that it has the leverage, when it's in a stronger position on the battlefield, it wouldn't want to accept any concessions, and it will pursue only the maximalist goals. That's the reason why it was the wrong time for Trump to engage in these negotiations.
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