In its race to rearm, the EU may have its most consequential partner in Ukraine.
What began as a relationship rooted in aid has, as the war grinds into its grim fifth year, evolved into a strategic alliance whereby the bloc is now gaining access to cutting-edge battlefield technologies.
Yet the partnership’s full potential remains hobbled by sluggish implementation and a fragmented defense market.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in Feb. 2022 forced Kyiv to reinvent itself into one of the world’s most innovative and agile military powers. Its defense industry, once marginal, now generates an estimated $50 billion in annual production capacity, up from $1 billion at the war’s outset. Still, that potential remains largely untapped by the European Union.
“The war has certainly forced European firms and governments to work with Ukraine’s defense industrial base out of necessity,” Daniel Fiott, professor at the Brussels-based Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, told The Parliament. “But this is still happening on an ad hoc rather than a structural basis.”
There are signs of momentum, such as the launch in Germany of the first of 10 planned joint drone ventures for 2026, but to maximize the economic and industrial benefit of Ukraine’s experience, far more efforts will be required by European capitals.
“Europe needs production, not just cooperation,” Fiott added, arguing that Ukraine has become a laboratory of modern warfare in contrast to the bloc’s more conventional approach. “Europe would be wise to industrialize that learning.”
Lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield
Last May, more than 16,000 troops from 12 NATO countries took part in a large-scale military exercise in Estonia, simulating high-intensity combat alongside Ukrainian soldiers and drone experts. The outcome of the exercise, known as Hedgehog, was sobering.
The drills exposed allied countries’ tactical shortcomings in modern drone warfare, ranging from faltering communication and coordination to limited battlefield visibility and sluggish target engagement.
“In practice, the alliance’s armed forces have realized that the modern battlefield differs significantly from what they had prepared for,” said Yaroslav Honchar, CEO of Aerorozvidka, a Ukrainian non-profit specializing in robotics, that supported the development of the battlefield management system used during the exercise.
“Even high-tech Challenger tanks are not capable of effectively countering the Ukrainian drone component,” he told The Parliament.
According to Aliona Hlivco, a Ukrainian-British political scientist and CEO of the London-based St. James’s Foreign Policy Group, the fast-paced innovation cycles driven by drone warfare are forcing European governments and industry to rethink procurement systems in order to scale and deliver capabilities to deter Russia in the years ahead.
“Ukraine has accumulated an enormous amount of operational experience,” she said. “That experience will fundamentally shape the future European security architecture — not only in kinetic warfare, ground forces, and air defense, but also in hybrid and asymmetric warfare, economic coercion and countering disinformation.”
Europe’s need for speed
Since the war’s outset, particularly since 2024, Europe has made some progress in integrating Ukraine’s expertise. The result has been incremental innovation — albeit slower than needed — and a growing recognition that, in wartime, speed is decisive.
“There is real and effective cooperation in areas such as ammunition and drones,” said Francisco Márquez de la Rubia, senior analyst at the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies. “But it exists alongside persistent structural barriers — including regulation, certification, procurement procedures, and access to financing.”
Mechanisms such as the EU–Ukraine Defence Industry Forum have been instrumental in matching Ukrainian demand with European industrial capacity — gathering more than 500 defense representatives to bolster collaboration. Likewise, the 2024 launch of the EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv has better coupled Ukraine’s operational needs with European capital and innovation.
But these initiatives have delivered uneven results. European capitals have yet to consistently link political efforts with financing tools and clear long-term contracts, a gap that continues to slow the EU’s rearmament efforts.
Several industry sources told The Parliament that, while there is greater predictability in certain areas such as ammunition orders, others are more uncertain. This makes it difficult for companies to plan, invest in expanded production capacity, strengthen supply chains and secure the financing needed for large-scale ramp-ups.
Márquez de la Rubia said that national governments should move beyond discussion forums with Ukraine toward concrete production lines, industrial consortia, and even the creation of a permanent advisory and coordination cell focused on drones, ammunition and R&D.
“War rewards speed, volume, and adaptability,” he said. “The EU still suffers from fragmented demand, excessively long procurement timelines, industrial bottlenecks and a mindset shaped for peacetime.”
Politics stalling Europe's defense
At the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, standard procedures like attaining a drone certification took about one year. That bureaucratic drag soon paralyzed the Ukrainian defense procurement system — forcing a shift toward decentralization, with slashed red tape and oversight as well as a proliferation of smaller, more agile players.
Speaking at an event organized by Friends for Europe last Tuesday, Tomasz Husak, director for defense policy at the European Commission, acknowledged that Ukraine’s decentralized industrial model “cannot be replicated” at the EU level.
However, its lessons are already shaping Brussels’ thinking. “Agility, experimentation, rapid testing, and openness to innovation” are increasingly embedded in the Commission’s plans, he said.
“What we seriously need — especially when it comes to the internal market — is defense readiness in terms of political will,” Husak added. “That is the final step required to ensure that all 27 member states start thinking in a truly integrated manner.”
To maximize the output of existing EU funds, greater European coordination and cooperation will be essential, a spokesperson from the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe told The Parliament. “Joint procurement, aggregation of demand, and in particular the harmonisation of technical requirements are key to avoiding fragmentation and ensuring interoperability.”
According to estimates from the European Parliament, a less fragmented market could yield savings of up to €57 billion annually by harnessing economies of scale.
Yet some capitals keep prioritizing domestic political considerations rather than common European efforts. Recent collaborative defense initiatives have also evidenced the tensions of multinational cooperation. For example, leadership disputes over the next-generation fighter jet being developed by Germany, France and Spain are now putting the future of the project at risk.
Europe now has the cooperation mechanisms, the hard-earned lessons from Ukraine’s battlefield experience and the industrial base to match. What it still lacks is speed. In a war defined by rapid adaptation and mass production, the bloc’s greatest vulnerability may no longer be capability — but time, and the disunity that wastes it.
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