As part of its rearmament plan for 2030, the European Union has proposed developing four flagship defense projects, including a continent-wide air defense shield and a drone and counterdrone system. To date, however, they remain largely political and industrial experiments in joint capability development.
"One thing is to create the idea and another to transform that idea into reality," said MEP Lucia Annunziata (IT, S&D). "Particularly in Western Europe, we still have strong skepticism about whether it is worth developing them."
On paper, all member states have agreed to launch concrete defense projects by the first half of 2026. In practice, differing threat perceptions across the continent — from north to south and east to west — are slowing the efforts.
While the technical foundations are largely in place, Annunziata says the success of the projects will ultimately depend on two factors: whether member states are willing to commit capabilities and procurement budgets, and whether the EU can secure long-term financing.
That resolve is now facing its first major test.
The SAFE test
The Russian drone incursions experienced by front-line states over the past year have added urgency to plans for collective defense projects, particularly those focused on drones and counterdrone technologies.
Countries on Europe’s eastern flank are among those pushing to accelerate these efforts, with SAFE — the European Commission’s €150 billion loan instrument — expected to play a central role in financing.
The proposed drone and counterdrone project, however, isn’t expected to be fully operational before late 2027.
"In the meantime, we are in a vulnerable situation," said Ionela Maria Ciolan, a research officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. "So it is important for member states to start exchanging more with the Ukrainians when it comes to drones, protection against drones and innovation."
Nineteen capitals submitted their national SAFE plans at the end of May, providing the first indication of how member states intend to use the instrument. The plans are expected to show which countries are willing to lead or co-lead the flagship projects, which capability gaps they consider most urgent and how far they are willing to go in pooling procurement.
"The Commission only plays a coordination role and, to a certain extent, a financing one,” Ciolan said. “But the member states are the main actors in the implementation of this defense readiness plan."
While the projects are often associated with the security concerns of Eastern Europe, Steven Blockmans, associate senior research fellow at CEPS, said their relevance extends across the bloc.
Capabilities developed under the initiatives could also support surveillance and monitoring operations in the Mediterranean, making them relevant for southern governments as well.
"This is a difficult debate in every member state, and there are trade-offs to be made in national budgets," Blockmans said. "But it would be short-sighted to deny participation in projects that are of fairly universal interest."
Defense funding questions
Designation under the European Defence Projects of Common Interest brings a range of advantages, from access to state aid that would otherwise be restricted under single market rules, to additional EU funding, faster permitting procedures, VAT exemptions and standardized administrative processes.
But the real question is what happens after 2027, when several of the EU funding streams currently supporting these projects are set to expire?
At present, SAFE, the €1.5 billion European Defence Industry Programme and the European Defence Fund form the backbone of EU-level support for the flagship initiatives. Their continuation under the next Multiannual Financial Framework — and how they interact with other instruments — will largely determine whether the projects can move beyond the planning phase.
"In the medium to longer term, we still need more understanding about how the next MFF will continue to finance these projects and what the role of the Competitiveness Fund and Horizon Europe will be," Ciolan said.
The European Commission’s proposal for the next budget cycle allocates roughly €130 billion for "resilience and security, the defense industry and space," a significant increase compared with the current framework. But negotiations are expected to be difficult, with competing spending priorities and the repayment of post-pandemic recovery funds likely to limit fiscal room.
For Annunziata, that constraint is where the real political battle will take place — not in designing projects, but in funding them at scale.
A recent report for the European Parliament similarly warned that, without sufficient financial capacity, the EU risks falling short of both its existing and future defense capability needs.
That pressure is already pushing debate toward more ambitious options. For Ciolan, additional joint borrowing for defense may ultimately become unavoidable if capability gaps are to be closed within the 2030 timeframe.
"This is a window of opportunity until 2030 for Europeans to work harder, faster and more seriously to close the strategic capability gaps that we have in our defense and security," she said.
Defense lessons from the past
Attention is now turning to the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), the Franco-German-Spanish next-generation fighter jet project that could either become a blueprint for European defense cooperation or another illustration of the challenges that plague multinational programs.
Analysts broadly see FCAS as an outlier, given its technical and industrial complexity. Still, they argue it offers important lessons alongside earlier programs such as the Eurofighter, the A400M and cross-border initiatives in batteries, hydrogen and energy infrastructure.
"Some of the latest projects of common interest show that an active role from the European Commission, together with the member states, in the development, design and monitoring of implementation is absolutely key from the start," Blockmans said.
He added that the Commission’s growing role in defense industrial policy remains relatively new and will require careful calibration with national governments.
For Ciolan, the decisive factor is political endurance. Large-scale defense programs have succeeded in the past not because they were flawless in design, but because governments kept them alive through delays, cost overruns and changing priorities.
She added that Europe’s defense ambitions also require a shift in mindset toward greater risk-taking. "That means we have to have a mentality in Europe that it's more risk-prone in order to innovate.”
Annunziata, meanwhile, said European defense cooperation is gradually moving toward smaller, more flexible groupings of two or three countries, rather than large multinational programs, in an effort to reduce political friction and align expectations.
Looking ahead, she argued that success will hinge on whether member states are willing to embrace tighter governance and shared decision-making from the outset — a prospect that remains uneven across capitals.
For now, the EU’s flagship projects remain suspended between ambition and execution. The plans are on the table, the funding instruments are taking shape, and the political case has been made. What remains uncertain is whether governments are prepared to act together when it matters most.
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