For years, Europe’s ambition to extend its boundaries eastward has languished as little more than a dormant file, rich in rhetoric, short on progress and shadowed by growing frustration.
Since Croatia’s accession to the European Union in 2013, the nine candidate countries — Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Kosovo, Turkey and Ukraine — have remained in a prolonged purgatory. Their stalled progress reflects persistent fears that further enlargement could complicate internal decision-making, alongside concerns about democratic backsliding and the financial burden of accession.
But that all changed in 2022, when Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted European leaders to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status, with security concerns driving a renewed push to speed up accession.
Last September, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was even more explicit, calling for the “reunification of Europe” and making clear that the future of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans lies within the Union.
In March, The Parliament caught up with Marta Kos, the EU’s enlargement commissioner, as she prepared a trip to Armenia to drum up support for the pro-EU government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The visit came ahead of parliamentary elections on June 7, widely seen as yet another contest between European and Russian influence along the EU’s eastern frontier.
Kos discussed how the EU is helping Yerevan fight ongoing Russian election interference, the prospects of Montenegro and Albania joining the bloc and why enlargement is ultimately Brussels’ best weapon against political destabilization.
This interview has been edited for clarity.
You’re heading to Armenia, one of the few countries in the region that Brussels views as moving closer to Europe. What will be your main message?
First, I want to express the European Union’s support for Armenia’s European ambitions and its readiness to work toward peace.
Second, what Armenia has achieved in such a short timeframe is truly significant, particularly with a peace deal underway. With peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a completely new logic of connectivity between Europe and Central Asia has emerged.
Third, Armenia is European. I would also like to strengthen people-to-people relations, because ultimately, this is something we should all actively promote within the EU.
Do you have a feeling that, based on the democratic backsliding we witnessed in Georgia, Brussels shouldn't take for granted the progress of certain countries that seem on a strong path toward membership?
Of course, it is not normal or natural that all our neighbors will go the European way. There are external disruptive forces who would like these countries to fail and be much more dependent on Russia or other autocrats. And they would also like to see us — the European Union — failing.
If we take the case of Ukraine, the conflict did not start with the war in 2022. It began earlier, when Ukraine chose the European way with a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU. Until then, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin tolerated Ukraine’s leadership, but that changed once the country moved away from Russia’s sphere of influence.
He could not accept that a neighboring country would choose a different direction.
The fundamental difference is this: Putin seeks countries around him to be economically weak, non-democratic, and dependent on Russia. Otherwise, he cannot control them. In contrast, what we do in the European Union — and this also applies to Armenia — is to support countries so their economies can grow, their societies can develop, and they can become stronger and then they decide if they want a partnership with us or not.
Do you see a risk of Russian disinformation influencing Armenia’s elections — as seen in Romania and Moldova — and how will the EU help safeguard their integrity?
This is already happening. And this time, I’m even more in favor of the European Union stepping in to assist the countries facing this kind of pressure — whether they are EU members or not. We should expect similar influence efforts in Armenia ahead of the June 7 elections.
Our experience in Moldova showed that Russia was prepared to spend millions, even hundreds of millions, to try to derail the country’s European path. They ultimately did not succeed. That experience has provided us with valuable lessons. For the first time, European institutions, working closely with partners, actively helped strengthen Moldova’s resilience.
We are already applying those lessons in Armenia. This includes support to defend against potential cyberattacks — something we also saw in Moldova — as well as efforts to counter disinformation and manipulation. Beyond that, we are focusing on strategic communication to fight Russian narratives.
We have seen three main strands of Russian narratives that we are actively working to counter.
First, there is the security narrative: if you go the European way, you will have a war or your country will be insecure; second, the economic narrative: if you accept European support — such as the nearly €500 million provided to Armenia in recent years — then you’ll be dependent on Europe. Third, and perhaps most striking, is the identity narrative. This is the idea that Armenia would lose its national identity by moving closer to Europe.
How do you view the ongoing peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
For us, Armenia is one of the most reliable partners in the East. And this is what we support. Never before have we done so much. And never before there was so much embracing from the Armenian side as there is today.
Both countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, are crucial for our connectivity agenda or Black Sea Strategy. We have to admit that, without the peace between those two countries, we couldn't do anything in this area. If you just look at what is happening now with the war in the Middle East, you will see it is not possible [to fly] over Russia, nor it is not possible [to fly] in the south because of the conflict there, so now this shows the importance of this area.
I was happy to hear that last year one of the first flights between Baku and Yerevan was bringing people from the civil society to host a civil society dialogue. The normalization between those two countries is very important also for the EU.
At the same time, we are also strengthening relations with Azerbaijan. We have the so-called TRIPP corridor, which will be financed by the U.S. We are now talking to Azerbaijan to build a railway through Nakhchivan. There are so many connections between these two countries.
With Montenegro set to conclude its technical negotiations this year — and talk of new safeguards in its accession treaty — what lessons has the EU drawn from the 2004 enlargement wave?
The enlargement process is moving and two countries in the Western Balkans are the clearest proof: Montenegro and Albania. The idea is that Montenegro will close all the chapters by the beginning of next year at the latest. This goes to show that, after many years during which enlargement was not a priority, it is now a reality, meaning that over the next few years both Montenegro and Albania — and perhaps some more — could become members of the EU.
We want to avoid a situation where, once a country becomes a member of the EU, starts behaving against the European treaty and especially against Article 2, which spells out our values, and Article 4, which refers to sincere cooperation. If a new country is complying with the EU treaties, these safeguards won’t be noticed at all. But if something goes wrong, then we would have an instrument, and those safeguards would bite hard. I can’t tell you more. We’re still developing some ideas.
For Montenegro, it will depend on what the member states will also include in the Accession Treaty. I hope that the Cypriot presidency or the Council will decide to build a working group on the Accessions Treaty with Montenegro. We will see more in the next month.
Some suggest Albania agreed to host Italy’s migration centres to secure political backing. Is it a valid claim?
You know, all 27 member states must approve each step as a country progresses toward concluding accession negotiations. So I am always pleased that Italy is a strong supporter of Albania’s path, but Italy also supports all Western Balkan countries.
Albania still has a lot of work ahead, but it has already made substantial progress. One of the major achievements last year was that all negotiation chapters have now been opened.
We are currently in the process of approving the interim benchmarks related to the rule of law. Once these are in place, Albania can begin closing chapters.
So while much remains to be done, the Albanian leadership aims to conclude negotiations by 2027 or 2028 — and we support it.
As enlargement commissioner, you must make the case to existing members. How might rising nationalist sentiment, particularly in France and Germany, shape the future of enlargement?
How we work against the idea that we should keep Europe for ourselves and not share it with newcomers is really important. When I hear comments like this, I would like to stress why we are moving ahead with the enlargement process.
We are not doing it for the candidate countries only. We are also doing it for us. After the Cold War ended, we didn't succeed to finish what I call Europe’s unification. The EU can’t be safe when our neighboring countries are dragged into instability or under Russian influence. Enlargement is one of the best proven tools for stability in Europe.
Second, if we will not integrate those countries, they will fall under the spell of other countries and they could be weaponized against us, just like Russia has done in Belarus by sending migrants to destabilize Europe. Third, they would contribute to making Europe independent. Yes, some of them are much less developed than us, but the main idea behind the EU integration is solidarity, helping them to get stronger on the field of economy and also democracy.
So this would be my answer to those who are skeptical that enlargement today is a good policy. It is the best policy we can use in the European Union to ensure an independent and united Europe.
Budapest continues to veto a €90 billion loan package for Kyiv. Is it realistic that Ukraine’s accession takes place within the decade, considering Hungary’s opposition?
Ukraine could only become a candidate country with the 27’s approval. I can understand concerns in the member states, and we have to deal with this. But blocking is in breach with Article 4. You mentioned Zelensky speaking about an accession on Jan. 1, 2027, and, of course, this is not possible.
Because we cannot afford to admit a country that is not yet fully prepared. That would not be beneficial either for the candidate country or for the European Union.
At the same time, I fully understand president Zelenskyy and why he is aiming for accession as early as Jan. 1, 2027. For him, EU membership represents a security guarantee.
The war is ongoing, and peace negotiations are underway. We do not know when they will conclude or what the final agreement will look like. In that context, EU membership becomes even more important for Ukraine.
We are supporting Ukraine, and it has already made significant progress. Financial assistance is partly linked to conditionality. For example, out of 68 major reforms expected over the past year and a half, Ukraine has completed 63.
So, once again, I remain optimistic that — just as we have done many times in the past — we will find solutions, both regarding Ukraine’s path forward and the €90 billion loan.
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