When officials at Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence convened early last year to assess the country’s space-based military capabilities, the conclusion was sobering.
Russia, they found, could draw on a fleet of roughly 200 satellites with military utility. Ukraine had just one. The disparity underlined not only Kyiv’s vulnerability in the early stages of the war, but a broader strategic gap that now occupies European policymakers: in modern conflict, space-based intelligence isn’t a luxury but a prerequisite for survival.
Since then, Ukraine has ramped up its domestic capability and secured access to images from commercial and allied constellations.
The lesson hasn’t been lost on Brussels.The EU's commissioner for defense and space, Andrius Kubilius, has called for a "big bang" approach to space, arguing that investments must match those of more traditional defense priorities.
“Space intelligence is very important and Russia is way ahead,” said Bohdan Danyliv, head of military affairs at the Kyiv-based Serhiy Prytula Foundation, which crowdfunded Ukraine’s first satellite through domestic and international donations. Russia, he said, has built a comprehensive space architecture — from military-grade positioning systems and communications satellites to dedicated internet capacity and a growing constellation of optical and radar platforms — giving it a formidable advantage.
Europe’s need to step up its space capabilities was underscored by reports on Feb. 4 that Moscow may have intercepted communications from key European satellites. Russian spacecraft have been loitering near Europe’s most critical geostationary assets, raising fears that sensitive data could be compromised — and that the interceptions could provide Russia with a blueprint for disrupting or sabotaging European space systems.
Europe’s space blind spot
In January, the European Commission approved the first batch of defense funding under its €150 billion SAFE Defense Fund, allocating low-interest loans to member states to accelerate military investment. While much of the focus has been on ammunition production, air defense and drones, space has emerged as a critical priority.
Under Kubilius, the Commission is considering a new satellite network to bolster military intelligence amid concerns U.S. support is waning.
Tracking military movements would need more regular flyovers than is provided by the EU’s Copernicus satellite service. Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is widely recognised as one of Europe’s most persistent strategic weaknesses. Despite possessing a sophisticated space industry, the EU remains heavily dependent on U.S. intelligence assets for continuous, high-resolution coverage.
In an increasingly fraught geopolitical environment, described by European Commission Chief Ursula von der Leyen in last year’s State of the Union speech as “dangerous and transactional,” that dependency is now viewed as a liability.
Ukraine’s lesson: scale and speed matter
According to Danyliv, the scale of the challenge means no single European country can hope to match Russia’s capabilities alone. “Europe needs to scale up the technology to be on the same level as Russia,” he said. “As individual countries they will not be able to achieve this — but together, yes.”
Ukraine’s wartime experience illustrates both the urgency of the problem and a potential path forward.
In 2022, the Serhiy Prytula Foundation used public donations to secure access to a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite operated by Finnish satellite manufacturer ICEYE — a system already in orbit, capable of delivering intelligence almost immediately. Unlike optical satellites, SAR technology uses radar that can see through clouds and darkness, providing round-the-clock cover.
The impact was significant. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, the satellite collected more than 4,000 images of Russian targets over two years, with 38% used directly to support strike planning that caused “billions of dollars” in damage. Targets included airfields, air defense positions, oil depots, ammunition warehouses and naval facilities.
In a single five-month period from September 2022, the satellite also captured thousands of images revealing tents, pontoon bridges, missile launchers and anti-aircraft systems, allowing Ukrainian forces to track enemy movements in near real time following the invasion.
Speed proved decisive.
“We only had access to Western satellites and their images could take two days to reach us,” Danyliv said. “We didn’t have time to buy a satellite and launch it — that could take years. We needed something already in orbit, and ICEYE provided that.”
SAR technology proved particularly valuable. Optical satellites, by contrast, are frequently compromised by weather conditions. “Sometimes you look at an optical image and there’s a big cloud,” Danyliv said. “You only see half the picture.”
The satellite has since been used to detect preparations for Shahed drone attacks. Designed by Iran, the low-cost weapons are mass produced at Russia’s Alabuga plant which churns out 5,500 every month — a figure that could double this year.
It is also used to identify camouflaged air defense systems and support complex operations such as Ukraine’s coordinated drone strikes inside Russia in June, codenamed Operation Spiderweb.
Preparing Europe for a wider war
For Danyliv, the lesson for Europe is stark. Russia, he believes, will “definitely” attempt to invade other European countries within the next decade. “They will try the Baltic states, then Poland and so on. It’s something some of our Western partners don’t want to accept, but in 2022, nobody believed Russia would invade Ukraine either.”
That assessment nonetheless underpins the EU’s accelerating defense agenda. Under the SAFE programme, Poland — due to its geography — is set to receive the largest allocation of loans, €43.7 billion, more than double that of Romania, the second-largest recipient.
Contracts funded under the scheme must meet a 65% EU-content requirement, reinforcing industrial autonomy alongside military readiness. In parallel, the Commission’s ReArm Europe initiative could unlock up to €800 billion in defense spending over the next four years.
Von der Leyen has repeatedly framed the moment as existential. “The reality of this world means we Europeans must defend ourselves and we must depend on ourselves,” she told the European lawmakers in Strasbourg in December.
A federated answer to Europe’s satellite gap
Against this backdrop, attention is turning to how Europe might rapidly build credible space-based ISR without creating a single, centrally controlled spy satellite.
The solution increasingly favored by policymakers and industry is a federated satellite system.
Rather than transferring sovereignty to Brussels, a federated model would link nationally owned and operated satellites into a shared operational framework.
Countries would retain ownership and control over their satellites, but operate under common rules that allow them to work together when required. In practice, this would mean satellites from different countries — SAR, optical, communications or signals intelligence — to be pooled for specific missions, regions or crises.
Access would be mission-based and time-limited, allowing coalitions of willing states to form quickly without permanent commitments. Artificial intelligence tools could further accelerate the processing and analysis of satellite data, delivering intelligence to military commanders and political decision-makers faster than ever.
Crucially, states could choose when and how to contribute, preserving political control while still benefiting from collective scale. For smaller member states, federation offers a pathway into high-end ISR without the prohibitive cost of full sovereign constellations.
Europe’s Industry outpacing politics
Industry is already moving in this direction. ICEYE, which plans to scale production to one satellite per week from 2026, has signed defense contracts with Poland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. Since 2018 the company has launched 64 SAR satellites for ICEYE and its customers, including sovereign systems that can be delivered within months of contract signing.
Finland has announced plans to pursue SAR cooperation with Poland and the Netherlands — widely seen as a first step towards a broader European constellation.
Joost Elstak, ICEYE’s vice president for missions, argued that SAR would form the backbone of any federated system due to its all-weather, day-and-night capability. He notes that while Europe has the technical skill and talent, the pace of implementation is now decisive.
“Building European resilience doesn’t require a choice between national sovereignty and collective defense,” he said. “A federated system delivers both.” He added that ICEYE’s platforms are designed specifically to enable interoperability, allowing governments to “turn a collection of national assets into a unified defensive capability” when circumstances demand.
Some analysts suggest Europe may have as little as five years to prepare for a direct challenge to its eastern flank.
Building sovereign ISR capacity in space — or at least reducing dependence on the U.S. intelligence community — is therefore no longer a long-term ambition, but an urgent strategic requirement.
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