The dynamics of the third year of the war in Ukraine already seem clear. The slow grind of military activity continues, with a faltering diplomatic process being managed by a disengaged United States administration and an underequipped Europe.
Away from the battlefield and the conference suite, the debate over sanctions continues. The EU remains determined to ramp up the effectiveness of its economic measures against Russia and its brutal war, and even President Trump has indicated that strong economic pressure on Russia through taxes, tariffs, and sanctions remains an option, if (as we all expect) the Russian leadership continues to obstruct efforts to find a peaceful settlement.
As someone who served as my country’s foreign minister and later ambassador to the U.S., I welcome any support for Ukraine’s fight for freedom. Sanctions are a crucial part of the campaign to weaken Russia’s infrastructure to the point where the war can be concluded favourably.
However, one major part of Russia’s economy has been largely untouched: agriculture. The G7 and EU have avoided sanctioning Russia’s agricultural sector and related industries, arguing that such moves would harm regular Russians and disrupt global food supplies.
But this logic is flawed. Russia is mostly self-sufficient in agriculture, so these sanctions wouldn’t harm innocent Russian citizens. In fact, food meant for export would stay in Russia, potentially lowering prices domestically. The real target should be the wealthy oligarchs who profit from agriculture and continue to support the war economy.
The EU has gone part of the way down this road by imposing heavy tariffs on Russian fertilisers. But these will kick in slowly,and treat the problem as if it were a mere matter of trade rather than of tackling a criminal military enterprise.
The G7 and EU have avoided sanctioning Russia’s agricultural sector and related industries, arguing that such moves would harm regular Russians and disrupt global food supplies
The global food supply has held up despite the war. Russia has already restricted its own agricultural exports to the West, and other countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt have filled the gaps. Russian fertilizer exports to developing countries were minimal even before the war.
What’s really happening is that oligarchs are using trade routes through Central Asia and the Gulf to bypass sanctions, and the West seems willing to overlook this. Trade with countries like Kazakhstan has surged suspiciously since 2022, benefiting sanctioned Russian elites.
Oligarchs like Dimitri Mazepin (Uralchem), Andrey Guryev (PhosAgro) and Alexander Tkachev (Tkachev Agrocomplex) continue to profit, even if they face personal sanctions. Because agricultural products and chemicals are excluded from the existing sanctions regimes, they’ve managed to keep money flowing (notably via Central Asian and Gulf countries) and support the Russian war effort.
Sanctions aren’t about being nice - they need to be effective. My own country, Montenegro, went through a painful period of sanctions and war in the 1990s. We've since joined NATO and are working toward EU membership. But even here, pro-Russian sentiment remains, especially when it seems like the West isn’t serious about holding Russia accountable.
For Ukraine’s success and the West’s credibility, we must close the loopholes. That includes sanctioning agriculture-related sectors and pressuring neighboring countries not to act as go-betweens for Russian trade. Sanctions are economic weapons—and they must be used effectively to help end this war.
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