Last year left the European Union on the back foot. After all, many of the bloc’s defining pressures in 2025 came from outside of Europe and left leaders reacting to, rather than shaping, key events.
Russia pressed on with its war in Ukraine, forcing an overhaul of Europe’s military posture. Donald Trump’s return to the White House renewed pressure on NATO allies, raised the spectre of troop withdrawals and triggered a bruising trade clash. To the south, continued Mediterranean crossings sustained tensions over migration.
Europe struggled internally, too. Political instability in France and Germany, the rise of right-wing parties and stalled defence programmes had a sanding effect on decisive action.
Yet crisis also drove change. Overlapping shocks had the EU machinery sputtering and clanking into action, accelerating integration in defence, diplomacy and migration — closing the year with a hard-fought and controversial financing deal to replenish Ukraine’s war chest.
As we head into the new year, The Parliament dialled up its favourite Europe connoisseurs to learn more about the challenges, risks and opportunities facing the continent in the year ahead.
Broadly, experts see external threats looming large, from hardening political rivalries to escalation in Ukraine. Meanwhile, they flagged potential wildcards that could turn things upside down overnight, alongside quieter — albeit equally worrying — threats like climate shocks, fiscal stress and waning faith in democracy.
There might also be new partners, from Canada and the United Kingdom to a loose global coalition seeking to save teenagers from social media.
Read on for their lightly edited analysis of what could be in store for Europe in 2026. And Happy New Year from the editorial team at The Parliament!
What is a black swan event that could supercharge European integration in 2026 — or cause it to fall apart?
United States v. China: weaponised interdependence
Arthur Leichthammer - Policy Fellow for Geoeconomics at the Jacques Delors Centre
A sharp escalation between the United States and China that weaponises chips and critical raw materials with extraterritorial reach on both sides. If firms are forced overnight to choose compliance, supply chains, or market access, the EU would no longer be able to muddle through with coordination-by-guidance.
Integration by escalation in Ukraine
Tomi Huhtanen - Executive Director at the Wilfried Martens Centre
A further escalation of the war in Ukraine could supercharge European integration and cooperation. Both the recently published National Security Strategy of the United States and the news of handing over responsibility for conventional military forces from the US to the Europeans within NATO, are changing how Europe operates. A concrete example will be the discussion of the formation of the European Security Council, which will speed up in 2026.
A populist plateau
Chase Foster - Lecturer at King’s College London
Right populist parties may be approaching a ceiling rather than a breakthrough moment. The Netherlands offered an early signal of this trend: Geert Wilders, one of Europe’s longest-standing populist figures, suffered a dramatic electoral defeat in October. Elsewhere, even entrenched leaders face headwinds. Viktor Orbán is confronting his strongest opposition in years despite his government’s control of the media, the politicization of the courts, and extensive civil society repression. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni is likely to retain power in 2026, but with a reduced majority and largely because she has transformed herself into a “normal” governing leader. The broader lesson may be that populists who govern like ideologues falter while those who survive do so by becoming more similar to the mainstream parties they once opposed.
A Nordic surprise for EU enlargement
Linn Selle - Director of the Europe Centre at the German Council on Foreign Relations
The European Council Meeting last weekend underlined a lack of member state dynamic vis-à-vis the EU enlargement debate, despite a very optimistic report from the European Commission in November. The tiny Nordic island state of Iceland could change all that in 2026. This summer, its government pledged a referendum to hold EU membership talks before the end of 2026, which were already conducted in the 2010s but stopped in 2015. This could turn the enlargement debate upside down since as a member of the European Economic Area and Schengen, Iceland already largely implemented the EU acquis and therefore could speed up the enlargement debate.
The end of Europe’s spoiler in chief
Daniel Hegedüs - Regional director of Transatlantic Trusts Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund
The Hungarian elections scheduled for April 2026 also carry significant black-swan potential. The elections will certainly not be fair. However, even if they are only halfway free, there is a realistic chance of an opposition victory. Such an outcome would remove the EU’s most significant internal spoiler: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has repeatedly demonstrated his readiness to sacrifice joint European interests in favor of Moscow or a Trump administration.
At the same time, Orbán may decide to remain in power through profoundly authoritarian means. The EU could thus face its first openly rigged national election in April 2026 — compounded by the possibility that the United States might swiftly recognize Orbán’s victory even under such circumstances.
Populists against the Union
Robert Muggah - Political scientist, security expert, and urbanist at the Igarapé Institute
A credible black swan in 2026 would be the emergence of a more disciplined alliance of illiberal or hard-populist governments inside the EU working in concert to weaken EU authority from within. In this case, the shock is not a Russian tank but a European veto. These actions would necessarily involve countries like Hungary or Slovakia leaving the EU, which is hard, but by blocking decisions, defying implementation, and turning Brussels into a convenient punching bag.
Europe losing the information fight
Amy Zalman - Global Security Futurist and CEO / President of the World Future Society
What if the EU cannot control the information environment from the top? A shift to addressing disinformation at the local level could be a black swan… but in slow motion.
Fifteen years ago, weaponized information was a novelty. Today it is a permanent feature of the European landscape. Despite the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the emerging “Democracy Shield,” top-down efforts to discipline platforms are meeting headwinds. Meanwhile, technology continues to race ahead of regulation: deepfakes, synthetic media, and generative AI are rapidly lowering the cost of producing persuasive falsehoods at scale.
If EU-level regulation proves insufficient because platforms comply only minimally, an effective patchwork of local disinformation governance could emerge.
What’s an under-the-radar threat facing Europe in 2026?
Platform regulation caught in geopolitics
Lena Maria-Boswald - Senior Policy Researcher at Interface
The growing politicisation of platform regulation risks obscuring who these rules are actually meant to protect: everyday internet users. With escalating tensions between EU regulators and predominantly US-based tech platforms, platform regulation could become a geopolitical proxy rather than a tool to protect citizens. In this geopolitical context, a climate of intimidation poses a particularly acute threat to democratic values, as governments and technology companies alike falsely equate any regulation with censorship, stifled innovation, and bureaucracy.
A low-growth choke
Arthur Leichthammer - Policy Fellow for Geoeconomics at the Jacques Delors Centre
The more prosaic but no less dangerous threat in 2026 is fiscal pressure in a low-growth environment. As budgets tighten, political space narrows just as demands for defence, industrial policy, and climate spending accumulate. This collision risks turning fiscal management into permanent crisis mode, crowding out strategic choices and locking governments into defensive postures.
The likely outcome: a largely status quo budget that preserves existing envelopes while stripping the Union of the flexibility it would need to respond to external shocks.
Weather shocks without a plan
Beatriz Abellán Merelo - Policy Analyst on International Relations at FEPS
Extreme weather events are not sufficiently addressed as a systemic threat by the EU and its member states. While the European Commission and national governments are focused on military spending and war contingency plans, this narrow conception of security overlooks the societal, economic, and governmental risks that the effects of climate change, in particular extreme weather events, pose to Europe, the fastest-warming continent. Adaptation remains underfunded and underprioritized, and key pillars of the European Green Deal and environmental regulation have been delayed, weakened, or rolled back over the past year, in the name of competitiveness and deregulation-driven agendas.
Defence but not autonomy
Ionela Ciolan - Research Officer in Foreign Policy, Security and Defence at the Wilfried Martens Centre
In 2026 Europe needs to focus on consolidating Europe’s strategic responsibility in practice rather than in slogan. First, Europeans should focus on building a robust European Defence Union that can fill the gaps left by the U.S.'s diminishing engagement. By working together, European countries can turn the European Union into a strong, credible global player in a world dominated by illiberal powers and transactional politics. However, if Europeans fail to come together and remain fragmented, they risk becoming vulnerable targets in an increasingly multipolar environment, making them easy prey for the ideological attacks of MAGA, Russian hybrid warfare and Chinese economic pressure.
Taiwan drifts into diplomatic isolation
Alicia Garcia Herrero, Senior Fellow at Bruegel and Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at French investment bank Natixis
A gradual diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, led by China through international organisations and bilateral pressure on its remaining partners, would create a slow-burning crisis that receives far less headlines than fears of invasion. With Taiwan’s ruling pro-independence party likely weakened after local election setbacks in early 2026, Beijing could achieve significant gains without military escalation. Prolonged ambiguity over Taiwan’s future, combined with uncertain signals from Washington and Tokyo, would quietly discourage new investment in the island’s semiconductor industry and prompt companies worldwide to rethink supply chains.
Europe would feel the effects gradually but painfully: rising prices and occasional shortages of chips would hit automotive giants in Germany and central Europe, slow the rollout of renewable energy projects, and increase costs for consumer electronics and medical equipment. Jobs in manufacturing and tech-dependent sectors could be lost as production shifts elsewhere more slowly than expected.
Europe's laws meet reality
Robert Muggah - Political scientist, security expert, and urbanist at the Igarapé Institute
Another under-the-radar threat includes policy deadlines that become political traps. The migration pact is a particularly controversial one. The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum is due to enter into application on 12 June 2026, including solidarity mechanisms that have long been politically toxic. Yet key governments are already positioning to resist.
The AI Act is another. Europe’s AI Act is expected to be enforced from 2 August 2026 onward. The under-the-radar threat is not that the AI Act is misguided. It is that uneven enforcement and slow institutional learning allow the information environment to deteriorate faster than regulators can react.
What or who could Europe’s unexpected ally be in 2026?
A coalition for safer social media
Lena Maria-Boswald - Senior Policy Researcher at Interface
Australia, Brazil, and the UK could all be unexpected allies. Together, these three states are converging — unexpectedly — around a shared policy objective: curtailing children’s exposure to harmful or adult online content through enforceable regulatory tools. At a time when these countries, several EU member states, and the European Parliament are considering stronger protections for minors online, I believe the EU can share in their learnings and hopefully shape regulation that both protects children and respects fundamental rights.
New bedfellows in rules-based trade
Beatriz Abellán Merelo - Policy Analyst on International Relations at FEPS
A “coalition of the willing” led by China, Brazil, Mexico and others could join forces to uphold a rules-based trade system that would benefit the EU. Over the past year, the US administration has systematically eroded the global trading system and weaponised tariffs for its political objectives. In this context, the emergence of a group of countries — including China — committed to the World Trade Organisation, would be an unexpected ally for the EU.
The other America that matters
Daniel Hegedüs - Regional director of Transatlantic Trusts Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund
The most important unexpected ally of Europe in 2026 may be the United States Congress. Through the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress has demonstrated that it can impose significant constraints on anti-European policies pursued by the administration. European governments, national parliaments, and EU institutions should invest far more resources in inter-parliamentary diplomacy with — and sustained lobbying of — Congress.
The ally Brussels already has
Petros Fassoulas - Secretary General for European Movement International
European citizens are Europe’s best allies. Despite the social, economic and political challenges we face, the majority of Europeans, both inside and outside of the EU, understand the value of European cooperation and integration. As demonstrated by consecutive Eurostat polls, but also by the outcomes of the Conference of the Future of Europe, Europeans have a more bold and ambitious vision of European unity. They want to have a greater say in the decisions that affect them at the EU level. Let’s involve them in those decisions, and the EU will have the most powerful ally we need.
A United Kingdom that needs Europe
Chase Foster - Lecturer at King’s College London
It has long been clear to most informed observers that Brexit has been economically damaging, and that the UK’s long-term prospects depend on closer alignment with the European Union. In a more fractured global economy dominated by two superpowers, the idea that Britain can thrive as an independent small open economy looks increasingly implausible. Economic data and security imperatives both point toward the need for deeper integration with Europe.
The lender that underwrites Europe’s security
Robert Muggah - Political scientist, security expert, and urbanist at the Igarapé Institute
A core ally for the EU is the European Investment Bank, the quiet enabler. It plans to increase lending for defence-related projects to €4.5 billion in 2026, supporting catalytic spending in areas such as military mobility and critical infrastructure. For a bloc where grand statements often outrun budgets, financial institutions that can invest in ports, rails, grids and dual-use infrastructure may matter as much as battalions on the frontlines.
A Canada pushed beyond Washington
Emil Archambault - Global Innovation Fellow in the Center for Security and Defense at the German Council on Foreign Relations
Canada is in many ways in a similar situation to multiple European countries: A NATO member whose security dependence on the United States has been fragilised, with a strong willingness to invest in defence procurement despite high budget deficits, and with an ambitious defence industry. As such, Canada's emerging security partnership with the EU (through SAFE, most recently) has the potential to strongly benefit both countries.
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