For years, the European Defence Agency has struggled to attract attention in its own backyard of Brussels. Now, after EU leaders tasked the intergovernmental body with taking on a stronger role, it is preparing a major overhaul aimed at expanding its influence in innovation, capability development, and joint procurement.
The three-step plan, to be rolled out through 2028, comes as the EU seeks to accelerate rearmament and deepen cooperation on defense spending.
But will the changes be enough to turn the EDA into the engine of European defense cooperation that many policymakers have long envisioned?
The agency has already handled successful cases of joint procurement, including the acquisition of 155 mm ammunition for Ukraine, and has helped member states identify potential collaborative projects, particularly in the field of loitering munitions.
Claude-France Arnould, who led the agency between 2011 and 2015 and is now a senior fellow at the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics, spoke to The Parliament about the EDA's future, its limitations and what is required to make it a key pillar of Europe's defense ambitions.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
The European Defence Agency has often been described as the EU’s “sleeping beauty” on defense. In your view, has the agency been overlooked since its creation in the early 2000s?
I certainly think it is a beauty because it is perfectly conceived and designed for the purpose of cooperation in the field of armaments, which is now a major priority. In a way, it is true that it has not been used to its full potential, and it was largely forgotten until heads of state and government rediscovered the EDA at the end of 2025. The European Council then gave a rather ambitious mandate to unlock the EDA’s potential.
EU defense ministers have now agreed to strengthen the agency’s role. Will these reforms allow the EU to unlock the EDA’s full potential?
There are good proposals, but for me they are not enough. In my experience as chief executive of the EDA, the position of "head" – above the chief executive – needs enough political clout to truly encourage cooperation and turn the will of heads of state, government leaders and ministers into reality. As long as we do not have a politician with a defense background at the head of the EDA, I do not think the agency can be successful at the level expected.
It is not a problem with the individual. This is not about [Kaja] Kallas, nor was it about [Josep] Borrell or their predecessors. It is really the position itself that is wrong. This is not stipulated in the EU treaty, so it could be changed through a Council decision. For me, you cannot be a vice president of the Commission, be in charge of foreign policy and, on top of that, deal with armament issues, which require quite different expertise.
What other changes are needed to boost the EDA's role in Europe’s rearmament and help it reach its full potential?
First, the agency should be entrusted with important programs. What it does is good and useful, but it does not fully embody what it could do in the field of defense.
I think the EDA should manage major programs, but these are not being assigned to it – just look at the Future Combat Air System project. I see no reason not to do so because, at the EDA, you can work in formats involving just two or three member states, and that would be an agile way to use it. The Commission cannot do that because it must be an equal partner to all 27 member states.
Moreover, the EDA can work with only those member states willing to do something together, hopefully something very significant, such as developing strategic enablers that could replace American ones. It could also include other countries in a more flexible way, including the U.K., Norway — which is already an important partner — and, why not, Canada.
To do all this, does the agency currently have the necessary resources?
I think there is both a funding issue and a staffing issue. Everyone always talks about the fact that the EDA does not have a sufficient budget, and it is true that the administrative budget is ridiculously small. However, the important funding is the money allocated to specific projects.
If member states place specific research, technology or development programs within the EDA, then the operational budget will reach the appropriate level. The Commission could also consider providing more significant support for actions undertaken by the EDA.
The same applies to staffing. Another beauty of the EDA is that its permanent staff remains relatively limited. For each program, it creates project teams that bring together experts from member states. This is a very important asset because the programs are overseen by national experts from member states that need these capabilities and will ultimately purchase and use them.
Do you think the EDA could eventually become Europe’s main procurement agency?
I think it has a vocation to become the European procurement agency, in addition to its current role. But considering the resources it has today, should it be the only procurement body for European countries? I think that is probably overambitious.
What would make sense is for the EDA to be at the center of a network where it could help define best practices for procurement and play a coordinating role, while still leaving procurement responsibilities to member states or coalitions of member states led by a lead nation. Only then could we see an incremental path toward the EDA becoming the center of European procurement.
For joint procurement, apart from the EDA, Europe has the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR) and NATO’s Luxembourg-based Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). Is there a risk of duplication?
What I think would be a bad idea is to duplicate efforts by creating a new procurement agency. As for risks, I think we can manage them and make the system useful.
OCCAR could be an important element in the network of procurement expertise. Should we merge OCCAR and the EDA? That has always been the question. Today, however, it is too complicated because of the differences in format, and the UK remaining in OCCAR. Cooperation between the EDA and OCCAR has always worked very well and they are fairly complementary.
The NSPA, for its part, mainly handles U.S. Foreign Military Sales and NATO common assets.
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