The European Commission’s €2-trillion proposal for the Union’s next long-term budget maintained the bloc’s focus on priorities such as defence and competitiveness, but enlargement received a larger piece of the pie than many expected.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called it “a strategic investment into Europe’s stability and prosperity” and confirmed that any accession would trigger a revision of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The proposal also includes €200 billion for “Global Europe” with resources earmarked for candidate countries, as well as a dedicated €100 billion facility for Ukraine.
The MFF proposal only offers a framework: politically, the debate over enlargement costs is just beginning. If the EU is to get closer to integrating Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans, the question of who pays and who gains will return.
Gradual financial integration easing EU budgets
Previous enlargements handled the strain through transitional tools that spread out costs without destabilising the budget. In 2004, for instance, new members were phased into full Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) support over a decade, preventing shocks to the EU economy. A similar gradual approach will be essential this time to avoid market distortions.
Some redistribution of funds is inevitable. Cohesion funding would need to shift toward poorer incoming countries, meaning that existing net recipients like Hungary and Romania would see reduced funding. But these adjustments would be minor compared to recent declines. Hungary’s net receipts fell from nearly 4% of its gross national income (GNI) in 2014 to just under 3% in the latest cycle, with little political fallout.
The Bruegel think tank estimates that even a full-scale enlargement, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the six Western Balkan candidates, would raise the EU budget from 1.12% to 1.23% of EU GDP, with an additional cost of just 0.17% of GDP for current members.
A January 2025 study for the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets estimates that enlargement could increase annual EU spending by up to €34 billion, especially if CAP rules remain unchanged. Yet it concludes that these costs are manageable via phased CAP integration, budget ceilings, and structural reforms. This is far from the fiscal catastrophe anti-enlargement forces claim.
Growing right-wing concern
Budgetary debates are fertile ground for politicisation, particularly by radical-right forces that have grown in influence across Western Europe.
Opposing the costs associated with admitting economically weaker states is a recurring theme among radical-right parties in net-contributor countries, a trend that we analysed in a recent study for the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
The PVV in the Netherlands, Rassemblement National (RN) in France, AfD in Germany, and the Sweden Democrats argue that enlargement would stretch the Union’s finances to breaking point. Their message to voters is that enlargement means less money for us — particularly farmers, regions and pensions — and more money for them.
This narrative is gaining traction. A 2023 survey found that fears about the cost to EU taxpayers ranked among the top reasons for opposing enlargement cited by people across Europe, alongside concerns about EU cohesion.
The radical right’s fiscal opposition to enlargement relies on selective truths and amplified distortions. Most candidate countries would be net beneficiaries of the EU budget, receiving more than they contribute, but this is nothing new. Every enlargement has followed this pattern and economically benefitted the Union.
Normalisation of radical enlargement narratives
Normalisation of radical narratives has seen them gain traction across the political centre, much like the discourse around migration.
Russian disinformation campaigns have amplified fears that Ukraine’s accession would hurt European agriculture, and radical-right parties have echoed these talking points by reframing enlargement as an attack on EU farmers and public finances.
During farmer protests in 2024 for example, senior figures from France’s National Front, including its leader Jordan Bardella, claimed that EU enlargement to Ukraine “would signal the end of French agriculture” by flooding the market with cheap imports.
In some member states, the risk lies in a potential institutional blockade. In France and Austria, referenda on enlargement are possible, potentially turning enlargement into a national battleground. A 2024 Ipsos survey found that 65% of EU citizens support a direct vote on which candidate countries can join the bloc. However, this does not imply a positive stance on further enlargement, and opens the door to referenda weaponised by Eurosceptic campaigns, especially if budgetary fears dominate the debate.
Positive impacts of enlargement must be portrayed
The most dangerous aspect of the far right’s budget narrative is not its distortion of facts, but its distortion of purpose. Enlargement is not just a matter of spreadsheets but a strategic investment. Expanding the Union stabilises its neighbourhood, extends its single market, and bolsters Europe’s geopolitical weight.
Enlargement would boost internal trade, supply chain resilience, and tax revenues, offsetting fiscal costs over time. It could enhance long-term EU competitiveness, a goal now central to the Commission’s new European Competitiveness Fund and MFF reform plans.
Yet, the risk remains that national debates and future Council negotiations will be dominated by fiscal alarmism, driven by shifting political dynamics. Pro-EU forces must make the case that investing in enlargement is a necessary step toward a stronger, more secure Europe.
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