Europe has spent too long under illusions that no longer hold. Peace was treated as permanent. Threats were dismissed as improbable. We convinced ourselves that power politics belonged to the past. That complacency was a strategic mistake — and we are now living with the consequences.
The provisional November agreement between the Council and the European Parliament on the so-called defence mini-omnibus — new measures to spur defence investments under the EU’s ReArm Europe plan — is an overdue recognition that Europe must take its own defence seriously. As rapporteur for this package, my aim was simple: give the EU the ability to invest faster, more flexibly and more coherently in the capabilities that protects us. This is not a breakthrough; it is a necessary course correction — an effort to rebuild what should never have been allowed to wither.
For years, countries on Europe’s eastern flank — including Latvia — warned that regimes like Putin’s understand only strength. Those warnings were too often dismissed as alarmist. Then came the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Today, Europe’s defence shortfalls are undeniable. Ammunition stockpiles have been run down to dangerous lows. Procurement cycles are tangled in bureaucracy. Aid to Ukraine has been delayed, primarily not by lack of will but by lack of readiness. These are political failures — symptoms of a deeper deficit of seriousness in how we think about security.
The defence mini-omnibus won’t fix everything. But it removes some of the structural obstacles that have crippled our ability to act. It simplifies co-operation, supports joint procurement, and empowers our defence industries — especially the small and medium-sized enterprises that are essential to innovation and resilience. It gives us the means to act faster and together. Whether we choose to use those means is another question.
The credibility of European defence depends not only on how much we spend, but where we spend it. We cannot speak about “strategic autonomy” while relying on third-country suppliers for critical military equipment. That dependency weakens our deterrence and undercuts our political independence.
This is not protectionism; it is strategic sense. Buying European strengthens supply chains, secures intellectual property, and ensures that European tax money supports European workers, engineers and technologies. The mini-omnibus helps enable this shift. The larger-scale Defence Readiness Omnibus that will follow should build on this foundation and take it further. But no set of tools, no matter how well designed, guarantees action.
It is time to stop treating defence spending as a political taboo. Security is not a luxury to be discussed only after domestic priorities are satisfied. It is the foundation on which all other priorities rest.
Deterrence requires more than declarations; it demands credible capabilities, real budgets and a readiness to act. Yes, investing in defence is expensive, but neglect is far more costly. Europe has learned this lesson the hard way — and at Ukraine’s expense.
If we wish to prevent the next war, we must prove we have the means and the will to deter it.
The window for strengthening Europe’s defences is still open, but it is closing fast. If we fail to act now, we will face the next crisis armed with the same excuses and the same regrets. If we act with urgency, co-ordination and conviction, we can restore Europe’s credibility and rebuild our citizens’ trust in the EU’s ability to protect them.
Peace will not be preserved by resolutions or by rhetoric. It will be preserved by strength — industrial, military and political. Europe’s security will depend on whether we choose to confront this reality today, not after the next war has already begun.
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