As the European Union looks for ways to strengthen its defence autonomy, it is turning to partners that risk undermining other pillars of its raison d'être. As migration and energy policies have already signalled, the bloc is open to striking deals that satisfy near-term demands while leaving longer-term concerns for another day.
When it comes to defence, Turkey is becoming an increasingly obvious choice. Its membership in NATO, strategically important location between Europe and Asia, and military-industrial prowess are convincing reasons for the EU to overlook a worsening human rights record and democratic backsliding.
Turkey has successfully leveraged its role in controlling migration flows to Europe from the Middle East, receiving billions of euros in assistance from Brussels. Extending that kind of relationship to defence, as Turkish President Recep Erdoğan expands his authoritarian-style rule, could create a risky dependency at a time the EU is struggling to become more self-reliant.
In March, the European Commission presented a defence package up to €800 billion in hopes of driving an investment surge in the bloc's own arms production. One of its pillars is SAFE, a €150 billion mechanism to provide attractive loans to member states. A soft “buy European” stipulation calls for 65% of the costs of certain military equipment to originate in the EU, EU partner countries like Norway (EEA/EFTA) or Ukraine.
Turkey's growing production for Europe
Additional countries, such as EU candidates or those part of an EU Security and Defence Partnership, while barred from receiving SAFE loans, can join procurement projects. Turkey, with the second-largest NATO force after the United States and real-world experience fighting wars and supplying troops, has a strong hand to play.
"Despite ongoing political challenges, this is a strategic reality that cannot be ignored," Giuseppe Spatafora, an EU-NATO relations analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), told The Parliament.
The Turkish defence industry has flourished in recent years, with exports totalling €6.3 billion in 2024. Turkey's military readiness — in recent years, its forces have intervened in Syria, Libya and Iraq, and its drones have played a major role in Ukraine's fight against Russia's full-scale invasion — has helped it assert its role as a regional power in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
As a NATO member, Turkish companies produce to NATO standards. Baykar, the Turkish producer of hot-selling drones, has signed contracts with Ukraine, Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, Poland and Romania. Another Turkish arms company, Otokar, won a contract with Romania for 1,059 Cobra II four-by-four vehicles.
At sea, Turkish shipbuilder, STM, signed a €123 million deal for logistic support vessels for the Portuguese Navy. Spain is signed up to collaborate with Turkey on its Hürjet training aircraft. Turkish-based Repkon is set to help make artillery in Germany, at a plant scheduled to go operational by early 2027.
Turkey is also a partner of the European Sky Shield Initiative, which focuses on the joint procurement of air defence systems to enhance Europe’s missile defence capabilities.
A joint venture between Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar could serve as a blueprint for how joint procurement within the SAFE framework might work. The agreement focuses on advanced drones from Italian facilities.
The challenge for all these projects is keeping business separate from politics. Turkey offers experience and infrastructure that EU members badly need, at a time when Erdoğan is jailing his opposition and arresting protesters.
Riccardo Gasco, the foreign policy programme coordinator at IstanPol, a Turkish think tank, thinks Turkey will leverage the former to distract from the latter.
“EU member states need to rebuild their defence industries, so they will sign defence agreements with Turkey in a much more discreet format,” Gasco told The Parliament. “The EU is acting in an emergency way but needs to find a balance between its values and its security needs.”
More military partner than potential EU member
The risk of a so-called lock-in effect, whereby the EU trades one kind of dependency for another, is hardly unique to EU-Turkish relations. The EU relies on several of its democratically troubled neighbours to control migration. On energy, it struck gas deals with governments of many ideological stripes. For pragmatists, this is merely the consequence of realpolitik that is unlikely to result in any huge geopolitical shifts.
"Propagandists of the [Erdoğan] regime are spreading the message that Turkish military power is paving the way to EU membership, but this is false," Nacho Sánchez Amor, the European Parliament’s Turkey rapporteur, told The Parliament.
Indeed, while Turkey officially remains an EU candidate country, joining the bloc remains as distant as ever. Turkey applied for membership in 1987 and was granted candidate status in 1999. Accession negotiations began in 2005, but have been on hold for years due to the EU's "serious concerns" regarding democratic standards and rule of law.
"The more Turkey is treated as a partner, the less it is seen as a potential member,” Sánchez Amor said.
This article was produced as part of the PULSE Thematic Networks, a European initiative that supports cross-border journalism.
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