How are recent geopolitical events and new realities in Europe changing the EU’s approach to health security, particularly concerning crisis preparedness?
The twin shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine have underscored the importance of reducing Europe’s dependence on global supply chains for critical goods. This recognition is shaping how the EU now approaches health security.
The disruption of medical supply chains during the early stages of COVID-19 revealed areas where a country’s ability to respond to large-scale health emergencies could be strengthened, and Europe was no exception. In this context, strategic autonomy has become synonymous with resilience.
For highly contagious pathogens, where response time is critical, having immediate access to medical countermeasures could be the difference between containment and catastrophe.
For biological threats such as smallpox and anthrax, which pose a unique combination of high transmissibility and mortality, the urgency is even greater. Ensuring that vaccines and antivirals are strategically stockpiled across EU Member States is critical not only for rapid deployment during a crisis, but also for maintaining deterrence against biological threats.
At SIGA, we see stockpiling as a key component of strategic autonomy, crucial for ensuring readiness in crisis response. This shift by the EU toward advancing its preparedness—driven by public-private partnerships, procurement frameworks, and regulatory readiness—is encouraging and essential.
For highly contagious pathogens, where response time is critical, having immediate access to medical countermeasures could be the difference between containment and catastrophe.
How has armed conflict and regional instability in Europe impacted the integration of biodefence into the EU’s broader security strategy?
For decades, the EU has focused primarily on economic and political integration. But the reemergence of military conflict on the continent has reinforced the reality that defence cannot be treated as a secondary concern.
In this broader recalibration, biological threats should be included in military threat assessments. Biodefence, once considered a niche or hypothetical issue, is now an essential pillar of modern security strategy. Highly dangerous pathogens, whether reemerging through accidental release, synthetic biology, or weaponization, represent a significant threat to public safety, economic stability, and military readiness.
Integrating biodefence into the EU’s strategic planning means committing to the tools and infrastructure that underpin it: detection systems, stockpiling of countermeasures, rapid deployment logistics, and scientific expertise. It also means revisiting frameworks for joint procurement and cooperative stockpiling across Member States.
The EU’s recent elevation of defence, including biodefence, through Commissioner appointments and the EU preparedness strategy release, are signals that this shift is underway. The next step would be to fully embed biodefence into the EU’s civilian and military doctrine.
This integration will require not only strategic planning but also sustained financial commitment, ensuring that biodefence capabilities are adequately resourced alongside conventional security initiatives.
The forthcoming review of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) offers a timely opportunity to explicitly include biodefence investments alongside conventional military spending, ensuring this critical capability is appropriately resourced for civil and military collaboration in responding to biological threats.
How should the EU build upon these developments to enhance its biodefence capabilities?
The appointments of Commissioners for Defence and for Crisis Preparedness are important milestones that reflect a broader awakening to the complexity of modern threats. Now the question is how to translate this political momentum into real-world capabilities.
For biodefence, the EU could establish a unified, interoperable framework for preparedness that spans all Member States. This includes not only harmonized procurement and regulatory pathways, but also pre-negotiated manufacturing agreements with industry, forward deployment of countermeasures, and integrated training exercises including both civilians and military personnel.
A centralized authority or coordination mechanism to oversee biodefence planning would improve cohesion and accountability. The recently released EU Crisis Preparedness Strategy and forthcoming Medical Countermeasures Strategy and stockpiling strategy represent an excellent foundation, but implementation will be key.
SIGA has seen firsthand the importance of sustained engagement with public partners in the United States through Project BioShield and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). BARDA has provided a model for Europe’s Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) by showing how sustained public-private partnerships, backed by multi-year funding and flexible contracting mechanisms, can drive the development and readiness of medical countermeasures in collaboration with industry.
This necessitates establishing clear, predictable funding mechanisms and agile contracting frameworks within the EU that incentivize industry investment and collaboration in developing and scaling up production of vital countermeasures.
Europe can adopt similar models to ensure that industry can reliably produce and deliver when it matters most. Biodefence is not a switch to flip during a crisis—it’s a capability that must be built, tested, and resourced in advance.
Looking ahead, what best practices in your view should the EU consider to ensure readiness against potential pandemics or bioterrorism events?
Pandemics and bioterrorism are high-impact, low-probability threats—but when it comes to biological risks, low probability should not be treated as low priority.
The EU could begin by establishing a dedicated biodefence initiative including a common threat assessment across Member States, aligned with the broader goals of the upcoming Medical Countermeasures Strategy and stockpiling strategy.
The backbone of this readiness posture could include the creation of regional stockpiles of approved vaccines and antivirals, strategically distributed to ensure equitable access and rapid response. Dual-use products with both civilian and military applications, especially those with multiple indications, should be prioritized due to their broader utility in crisis scenarios.
But stockpiles alone are not enough. The EU may also consider developing transpor tation and deployment protocols and establishing frameworks for international collaboration. Such steps would enable Europe to act decisively in the crucial early hours of an outbreak.
Furthermore, funding ongoing R&D into next-generation medical countermeasures and diagnostics would help ensure it stays ahead of evolving threats.
Lastly, regular field exercises involving both civilians and military units will be essential for identifying logistical challenges and validating response plans.
Readiness against biological threats will require coordination, resources, and resolve. But as COVID-19 has shown, the cost of inaction far exceeds the investment required to prepare.
Sign up to The Parliament's weekly newsletter
Every Friday our editorial team goes behind the headlines to offer insight and analysis on the key stories driving the EU agenda. Subscribe for free here.