We are witnessing a moment of acute global fragility. Missiles continue to strike Ukraine, Russia is doubling down on its neo-imperial aims and the Middle East remains on a knife-edge.
At the same time, Donald Trump has openly challenged the foundations of the international order — not only through his intervention in Venezuela, but by menacing the EU in his relentless bid to acquire Greenland.
While the US president has since backed down from his threats of imposing additional tariffs on some European countries and musing about military intervention on the Arctic island, the episode underlines how quickly economic coercion can be mobilised, even against allies. It also shows why Europe urgently needs a European Security Alliance (ESA): a standing framework to deter and respond to economic coercion before it escalates.
Wake-up call
Greenland is a warning shot. It shows that trade, access to markets and economic leverage have become tools of geopolitical pressure, and that even close partners are no longer insulated from them. The temporary retreat from tariffs does not reduce the risk; it highlights the need for contingencies.
Without economic security, there can be no lasting prosperity. In a world of weaponised interdependence, openness alone no longer protects growth, industrial capacity or technological leadership. Economic security has become a necessary condition for sustaining Europe's economic model.
This episode also revealed something else: when the European Union acted collectively and signalled a robust response, it created deterrence. A common approach reduced vulnerability and raised the cost of escalation. But that response was improvised rather than embedded. Europe needs a permanent mechanism to ensure that deterrence can be deployed quickly and credibly when pressure returns — as it likely will.
Therefore, an ESA would not be intended as a reaction to a single foreign leader or crisis, but a durable framework for economic security in an era of recurring pressure.
The EU has already developed important tools that point in the right direction: trade defence instruments, the Net-Zero Industry Act, the Critical Raw Materials Act and the European Chips Act. The Anti-Coercion Instrument, in particular, was designed for precisely the kind of threat seen in the Greenland episode — requesting the European Commission to negotiate with a third country to stop economic coercion or counteract it if necessary.
However, these measures remain fragmented, politically fragile and embedded in a Union that includes countries with very different political orientations. They do not amount to a coherent system capable of ensuring rapid, collective responses when economic coercion is applied.
An ESA would provide that missing framework. It would connect existing instruments into a durable system of collective resilience and elevate economic security to the same strategic level as defence. In that sense, it would be the economic counterpart to Europe's emerging defence union, protecting the industrial, technological and financial foundations on which military capability and political autonomy depend.
Economic deterrence
Deterrence today is not only about the military. Liberal democracy must demonstrate that it has the economic tools to deter aggression and neo-imperial ambitions. It depends on the ability to impose costs, deny leverage and act collectively when economic power is used to undermine sovereignty.
This matters directly for Ukraine. If economic coercion and territorial pressure are normalised elsewhere without credible consequences, Russia is encouraged to believe that aggression pays.
This is where an ESA becomes essential. Rather than coordinating a single EU instrument, it would synchronise measures against economic coercion more broadly — aligning responses, pooling political resolve and enabling faster, more credible action by like-minded democracies, while still operating alongside the Union.
Crucially, an ESA would not be limited to the EU alone. Like-minded partners could include the United Kingdom, Norway, Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia — democracies with deep economic ties to Europe, shared exposure to coercion and a clear interest in defending open but rules-based markets. Participation would be conditional on respect for the rule of law, market principles and territorial sovereignty.
The United States presents a more complex case. In principle, Washington would be a natural partner. In practice, recent events underline why Europe cannot make its economic security contingent on US domestic politics. An ESA should therefore be able to function without the US, while remaining open to cooperation or eventual participation under different political conditions.
Building such an alliance would take time, but preparation cannot wait.
Initial steps could include agreed contingency playbooks for economic coercion, coordinated responses to pressure, joint management of strategic reserves and aligned approaches to securing critical supply chains. The aim is deterrence through readiness, not escalation.
The greatest risk today is not a lack of tools, but hesitation and division. Within Europe, some remain tempted to trade long-term security for short-term advantage. Others are openly hostile to liberal democracy, transatlantic cooperation and NATO. Fragmentation invites pressure.
Greenland shows what is at stake. In a world where economic pressure is becoming routine, sovereignty belongs to those who can defend their economic foundations. An ESA would ensure that when coercion returns, Europe is not forced to improvise. It would already have a credible, collective response in place.
Economic security is no longer optional. It is the frontline on which Europe's future will be decided.
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