Viktor Orbán's loss of power in Hungary marks a turning point for Europe's far right. For years, he styled himself as the continent's standard-bearer of illiberal democracy and U.S. President Donald Trump's closest European ally.
Yet his defeat underlines a more fundamental truth: external backing and ideological alignment offer little protection when domestic discontent takes hold.
Even vocal support from figures such as U.S. Vice President JD Vance could not compensate for political vulnerability at home.
Orbán's model — combining nationalist rhetoric, centralized power and international alliances — proved less resilient than it appeared. When it comes to electoral survival, loyalty is expendable.
EU-U.S. far-right divide
Orbán's defeat is part of a broader pattern revealing the fragility and fragmentation of the transatlantic far right.
Illiberal parties across the European Union have long proclaimed their ideological affinity with, and admiration for, Trump and the Make America Great Again movement.
But that relationship is increasingly strained.
The European Parliament's vote on the EU-U.S. trade deal offered a telling example: despite Trump's preferences, far-right parties including Alternative for Germany and France's National Rally abstained or voted against closer transatlantic economic ties.
The reasons are both political and structural. Trump's current policy agenda is almost universally unpopular, even among fellow ideological allies.
His confrontational approach to Iran — and the resulting instability and rising energy prices — sits uneasily with parties that present themselves as defenders of stability and economic security.
Aligning too closely carries domestic risks when voters feel the economic consequences directly. Trump is shifting from an electoral asset to a toxic liability.
His aggressive mercantilism clashes with the economic nationalism of Europe's far right. Tariffs and subsidies designed to benefit U.S. industry come at the expense of European producers — including those these parties claim to defend.
These tensions are increasingly visible. In the U.K., the Reform party has been cautious about embracing policies that would expose British businesses to U.S. protectionism. Economic nationalism does not translate well across borders.
Trump has publicly criticized Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni over her support for Pope Leo XIV, underscoring how quickly ideological alignment can give way to political divergence.
Europe's far right is not only nationalist but often rooted in distinct cultural and religious traditions that don't align with Trump's brand of politics.
Nor is this divergence entirely new. Many illiberal figures, including National Rally leader Marine Le Pen, have long harbored strands of anti-Americanism, rooted in opposition to U.S. influence or intervention.
Some have cultivated ties — political, ideological or financial — with strategic adversaries of both the U.S. and Europe, notably Russia and China. Le Pen's party received a €9.4 million loan from a Russian bank in 2014, while Italy's coalition government led by the Five Star Movement and Lega was the only G7 country to join China's Belt and Road Initiative in 2019.
For all their national differences, many far-right ideologues — from Orbán and Le Pen to Matteo Salvini in Italy, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, as well as Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla in Germany — share an ambition that goes beyond domestic politics: to reshape the international order, including Europe, along illiberal lines. But that ambition depends on coordination and mutual support.
The growing transatlantic rift makes such alignment increasingly difficult.
Critical moment for liberal forces
For liberal democracies, this is a strategic opportunity.
Trump's growing unpopularity may spill over, weakening those in Europe who have aligned themselves too closely with him.
The contradictions between competing nationalisms, between rhetoric and reality, and between external alliances and domestic priorities can be exposed and exploited.
But this is not a moment for complacency. Orbán's defeat shows that illiberal leaders can be defeated — but it does not mean the forces behind them have disappeared.
Money will still flow to support illiberal narratives, movements and ideologies. Fragmentation can be temporary; divisions can be bridged.
Democratic forces need to go on the offensive by exposing and deepening these divisions, ensuring that the hypocrisies, corruption and contradictions of the far right are in plain sight.
Disunity has long been a weakness of liberal democracy. When it afflicts these movements, it is an opportunity.
The far right is divided. The question is whether democratic forces will act on it.
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