Never in its history has the European Union faced greater global uncertainty. Russia's imperial invasion of Ukraine, escalating conflict in the Middle East and unpredictable transatlantic relations mean EU leaders cannot afford to lose momentum in strengthening defense capabilities and building new alliances.
The EU must invest more heavily in the security and defense partnerships, or SDPs — agreements focused on military and strategic cooperation with non-EU countries.
The European Parliament recently adopted my report on SDPs, setting a path toward deeper and broader cooperation with key bilateral partners.
So far, the EU has signed these agreements with Canada, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, Norway, Moldova, Albania, North Macedonia, Australia, Ghana and India.
These partnerships are crucial to building spheres of common interest across areas ranging from joint military training and defense-industrial collaboration to cybersecurity, hybrid threats, peace operations, counterterrorism and maritime and border security.
Yet all of them respond to the same imperative: protecting the EU against spheres of influence and renewed imperialism ambitions.
Beyond the EU-NATO partnership
The EU-NATO partnership remains the cornerstone of European defense, underpinned by the U.S. strategic deterrent.
At the same time, as the U.S. shifts its strategic focus, member states must invest far more to close critical capability gaps and deepen defense cooperation with other NATO countries such as the UK, Norway and Canada. The war in Iran is straining U.S. military capacity, reinforcing the case for accelerating these efforts.
The UK — arguably the EU's most important bilateral defense partner — should be fully integrated into military mobility schemes to streamline cross-border troop movements and avoid regulatory bottlenecks, as well as joint defense-industrial projects at all levels.
Oslo remains a crucial ally because it shares a border with Russia, while cooperation with Norway and Canada also forms the basis of Europe's strategic refocus on the Arctic in response to growing pressure from the U.S. within NATO.
Boosting deterrence also requires deeper integration with Ukraine, including ties with its defense industry, expanded military mobility links, battlefield innovation and the lessons it continues to offer on modern warfare, from integrated AI-assisted targeting and digitized military logistics to drone capabilities.
Regional spheres of common interest
The EU must work more closely with key security partners around the world to build a stronger power base.
The Israeli-U.S. war against Iran has underscored the strategic importance of the Middle East and North Africa, while exposing Europe's vulnerability and limited room for maneuver.
Stabilizing the region is a shared strategic interest with NATO ally Turkey, as well as with partners such as Egypt, Jordan and Gulf states.
Partnerships like these are crucial for the EU to shape a balanced regional strategy — one that avoids direct involvement in the conflict while protecting core European interests such as securing energy supplies and maritime routes.
Beyond Ukraine, the EU also shares common security interests with partners in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. EU candidate countries such as Moldova, Albania and North Macedonia have already signed defense pacts, while Montenegro is expected to follow.
This trend also highlights the growing importance of SDPs in the broader path toward EU enlargement.
These countries are confronting Russian efforts to destabilize the region, and it is in the EU's strategic interest for them to join the Union as soon as possible.
To protect its southern flank, the EU must also work with African partners to counter growing threats in the Sahel, particularly the risk of state collapse in Sudan, a country with strategic Red Sea ports increasingly affected by terrorism and Russian influence.
Closer ties with resource-rich countries in African countries such as South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Nigeria are also essential, and the recent security and defense partnership with Ghana sets an important precedent.
In the Indo-Pacific, the EU has signed defense pacts with Japan, South Korea and Australia, forming the backbone of a sphere of common interest aimed at deterring China's increasingly assertive policies in the South China sea, control over rare-earth minerals and renewables, as well as cyber and AI capabilities.
Success in projecting the EU power begins with overcoming internal divisions among member states. That longstanding reality takes on new urgency amid today's growing geopolitical tensions.
To paraphrase Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Europe must avoid ending up on the menu. Instead of merely earning a seat at the table, it must be strong enough to shape the table itself.
Marcin Buzanski, senior adviser to the Warsaw Security Forum, contributed to this article.
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