Bulgaria has finally emerged from five years of political paralysis marked by eight general elections.
Former President Rumen Radev’s center-left Progressive Bulgaria party didn’t only win the April 19 elections but secured a parliamentary majority — something no party has achieved since 1997. Campaigning against what he called an “oligarchic governance model,” Radev now has the mandate to govern alone.
In his victory speech, the often Euroskeptic, Russia-friendly politician promised to build “a strong Bulgaria in a strong Europe,” while urging pragmatism on security, industrial revival and competitiveness.
But uncertainty looms over what pragmatism will mean in practice.
Radev has previously criticized EU sanctions on Russia and military support for Ukraine since the former's full-scale invasion of its neighbor in early 2022. Instead, he's advocated for dialogue with Moscow. In Brussels, some now question whether he could echo the role played by Hungary's just-ousted Viktor Orbán in disrupting European unity and undermining support for Kyiv.
In an interview, MEP Radan Kanev (EPP, BG) said Radev will be more likely to resemble Slovakia’s Robert Fico in “speaking one thing, [and] doing a different one.”
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
How do you view the outcome of the Bulgarian elections and what does it mean for the European Union?
The most important element here is that the voters of Progressive Bulgaria are by no means a pro-Russian majority. It’s a very large voter body which gave Mr. Radev the ultimate victory in the elections, but only a fraction of it is either moderately Eurosceptic or outright anti-European.
Then, we have a significant number of centrist voters motivated exclusively by anti-corruption feelings, messages and promises of Radev. And then we have a number of voters ... who simply wanted to end the period of instability. So, how Radev as the future Prime Minister, which I don't doubt he will be, will try to accommodate the priorities and feelings of these groups is early to assess, but I would look very closely at his nomination for foreign and energy ministers.
Just last month, reports emerged that Hungary's foreign affairs minister had leaked sensitive information to Moscow. Should we be concerned about similar risks under Bulgaria’s incoming government?
Once again, it's a matter of the nominations Radev will make, including the future minister of defense.
Personally, I don't feel at ease. But I'm representing a staunchly pro-Western-and supporting-Ukraine part of the Bulgarian population. We saw in this election that this isn’t the motivation of the majority. Most people don't vote for foreign policy.
After the experience with Hungary's Fidesz party, is the EU better shielded from future cases of foreign interference?
I guess that after the case with Péter Szijjártó in Hungary, there will be a lot of caution. And I would say as a Bulgarian, unfortunately, I assume that our government officials will be subject to that caution as well.
But in my view, these public pro-Russian stances and in a way anti-Ukrainian stances taken so far by Mr. Radev will be a big problem for the integration of Bulgaria in the future defense union. When somebody is quite rightfully labeled pro-Russian by the world media at large, that of course lowers trust in him.
Do you think that could impact future potential collaboration with other European defense companies?
The defense industry is quite important for Bulgaria. And not only after the Russian invasion [of Ukraine], but also before that, and especially after. Here we have a strong contradiction in the messaging of Mr. Radev. On the one hand, he has always pleaded for an even stronger defense industry on a local level. On the other hand, he's speaking against any military aid for Ukraine. And a significant part of the Bulgarian defense industry is obviously directed to support Ukrainian defense efforts. Moreover, Bulgaria has never offered any defense material for free. We have always sold our production.
We have seen this in Slovakia under [Robert] Fico. He speaks very much against supporting the Ukrainian war effort, but the Slovakian defense industry is strongly delivering to Ukraine. So, I would expect a more flexible position from a future [Bulgarian] government: speaking one thing, doing a different one.
Could Radev's presence at the European Council influence discussions on whether to reopen dialogue with the Kremlin?
I guess he will be publicly outspoken. But as we know, resuming dialogue is an extremely vague concept. When it comes to imposing new sanctions, I wouldn't expect Bulgaria to be more than vocal on, let's say, complaining.
But as we saw, even Hungary under Orbán made the respective trade-offs. I don't think that the interest of the Bulgarian government, whichever it is, is to be in open political conflict with Poland, the Baltic or the Scandinavian states. These are countries we have quite similar interests with on a European level. So, it will be difficult to build trust with them for this government anyway, and I don't think that Mr. Radev will seek out conflicts.
The EU is pushing for a full ban on Russian gas imports by next autumn. Could Radev’s support for cheap Russian energy imports complicate or weaken that push?
If there’s a majority in the European Union for any type of renegotiating the sanctions regime for oil and gas, it's certain that the Bulgarian government will be part of this majority. But on the other hand, we must keep in mind that Bulgaria has virtually no imports of either oil or gas from Russia, except maybe some re-exports through Azerbaijan, Turkey --things that we can only have suspicions about. So we aren’t dependent on Russian fossil fuels for the moment.
Radev has said he’s open to collaborating with other parties, especially to reach the supermajority needed to fulfill his promise to reform the captured judiciary. Would your coalition be ready to engage with him on this matter?
In the political crisis for the last five years, we never had the two-third majority required by the constitution to elect new members for the Supreme Judicial Council. So the governing party will need to partner with the -until-recently-dominant GERB party or our coalition. The signal from Mr. Radev is that he will look for our support, but I'm afraid it can’t be easily given, because for us, the reform of the judiciary is the highest priority.
Our political conditions will be very strong on the transparency of the process, the nominations and the choosing of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council.
I don't trust pro-Russian politicians to be in favor of the rule of law. I think this is an internal contradiction. So I expect very difficult negotiations which might easily fail and then, he [Radev] will presumably use other options. This is also something which everyone sees as a priority, so it should be resolved rather sooner than later, and it will be very telling as a process.
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