Amidst intensifying geopolitical tensions and the accelerating climate crisis, critical minerals have emerged as strategic national assets and potential flashpoints of conflict between major economies.
Buried ingredients like lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earths power everything from Europe’s wind turbines and electric vehicles to advanced weapons systems, yet they are increasingly used as instruments of political leverage: export bans, trade restrictions and stockpiling are spreading, threatening to fracture the global supply system that underpins both the EU’s green ambitions and defence technology.
While adding more and more elements to lists of critical materials, as just announced by the Trump Administration, and taking a resource-nationalist approach of stockpiling may shore up supplies in the short term, it also risks triggering retaliatory policies, such as the imposition of further export restrictions or bans, intensifying geopolitical tensions.
For Europe, the lesson is clear: it cannot secure the materials of the future through competition alone. To avoid a new age of mineral mercantilism, the EU must take the lead in building cooperative global governance for critical raw materials.
A fragmented CRM system
Today, the world’s critical mineral value chains are governed by a fragmented patchwork of national policies, bilateral deals, and private contracts. Environmental standards for mining and processing operations are often sidelined, and transparency is scarce.
What is missing is an institution capable of coordinating policy, mediating disputes and promoting responsible resource management. The idea of an International Materials Agency (IMA) — as proposed by the UN’s International Resource Panel and, more recently, by the Global Investor Commission on Mining 2030 — offers precisely such a mechanism. Much like the International Energy Agency (IEA) was created in response to the 1970s oil shocks, an IMA would offer a platform for cooperation between governments and industry, strengthening data transparency and equitable access to crucial resources.
Europe’s strategic role in CRM coordination
The EU is well-positioned to drive this effort. Building on initiatives like the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, the EU can leverage its normative power, convening capacity, and longstanding engagement in multilateral environmental and resource governance.
An EU-led coalition could launch the first phase of the IMA, providing seed funding and political support for a structured feasibility initiative. This phase would define the institutional design, governance model, legal framework, financing tools, and functional priorities.
It would also explore how the IMA could promote data transparency, circularity in critical minerals, benefit-sharing, and indigenous rights protection across mineral-rich regions.The agency would offer technical assistance and capacity building to help countries strengthen regulatory oversight, negotiate fair contracts, and attract investments in local value addition.
Finally, it would play a diplomatic role in dispute resolution, helping prevent resource-driven conflict by mediating between governments, corporations, and affected communities.
Such an agency would not start from scratch. It would build — not duplicate — the work of existing initiatives, including the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining (IGF), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ESG investment standards of the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM).
By connecting and strengthening these efforts, the IMA could help navigate tensions between producer and consumer countries and provide a coordinated, inclusive approach to managing global mineral supply chains and uphold environmental standards.
From resource rivalry to shared stewardship
A key early mission for the IMA could be to establish a global data hub on mineral supply chains — offering open-access information on material flows, reserves, production, processing capacities, prices, environmental impacts, and circularity rates. Much of this data is currently proprietary or restricted as national security information, fuelling market uncertainty. Shared transparency would be particularly beneficial for developing countries that lack access and capacity for robust data analysis.
The IMA is not envisioned as a fully-fledged UN body. Given the current context, it could follow the model of the IEA — launched as an OECD or G20 initiative and expanded over time. What matters most is building a coalition of proactive states willing to coordinate and shape the foundations of global mineral governance, guided by transparency, high environmental standards, equity, and resilience.
It could also help operationalise emerging partnerships, such as the proposed G20 Critical Minerals Framework through investment support and technical cooperation.
Ultimately, the IMA offers Europe a chance to turn a strategic concern into a global leadership. In a fragmented world marked by rising resource nationalism and geopolitical rivalry, Europe must help forge a cooperative, transparent, and resilient global system for managing the materials underpinning the green and digital transitions. Led by a coalition of willing states with Europe at its core, the IMA could become the institutional backbone of that system.
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