Q+A: Should the EU punish Hungary ahead of next month’s vote?

MEP Daniel Freund said in an interview that member states and EU leaders have ignored "the Orbán problem" for too long and that the bloc should move to cut Hungary out of sensitive negotiations immediately.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after European Council meeting, brussels, Belgium, March 19, 2026. (European Union)

By Paula Soler

Paula Soler is a reporter at The Parliament Magazine

25 Mar 2026

@pausoler98

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government is once again in the spotlight in Brussels, where EU diplomats are under mounting pressure to address allegations that Budapest is leaking sensitive information to the Kremlin.

Over the weekend, The Washington Post reported that Hungary’s minister of foreign affairs, Péter Szijjártó, had routinely debriefed his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, before and after EU summits in Brussels. Initially, Budapest denied the allegations, labelling them “fake news.” However, the Hungarian foreign ministry later admitted to regularly contacting Lavrov, calling it “standard practice” in diplomatic relations.

The Council of the European Union is now examining any potential breaches of confidentiality by Szijjártó, while the European Commission has also called on the Hungarian government to clarify the “greatly concerning” allegations.

While Poland’s Donald Tusk said that the Post report “should not come as a surprise to anyone,” most reactions across the EU have so far been muted. European diplomats say that’s largely down to the Hungarian elections on April 12, which could usher in a win for the pro-European centre-right opposition party TISZA after 16 years of Orbán rule.

However, in an exclusive interview with The Parliament on Wednesday, MEP Daniel Freund (Greens/EFA, DE) said member states and EU leaders have ignored "the Orbán problem" for too long, and that the bloc should cut Hungary out of sensitive negotiations immediately, not after the elections.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

How do you assess the EU’s response to the allegations reported in the Post story?

So far, I have to say, I haven't really seen much reaction. I heard [EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy] Kaja Kallas yesterday, but it seems to me the Hungarians are passing sensitive information to the Russians that are waging war on a candidate country, so that should actually trigger immediate suspension of the Hungarian government from the Council and from access to [sensitive] information. We can make sure that it is not being passed on to the Russians or other enemies, and that I fear is not happening at the moment.

The EU could suspend Hungary from its voting rights via Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which is often framed as the “nuclear option.” Do these reported revelations justify invoking it?

The use of Article 7 was justified since we triggered it in 2018. It has been justified increasingly since then. These revelations further justify it, but as I said, [Hungary] should be suspended from [the] Council, [it] should not be let into the room anymore to participate in any of these [sensitive] discussions.

Do the EU institutions and Orbán’s counterparts in member states fear that if they take further action against Hungary, he could exploit it for electoral gain next month?

There's constant fear of interference. We cannot halt the whole European Union every time someone votes somewhere. We had elections in Denmark yesterday; we had elections in Germany on the weekend. If we stop working because someone is voting, the European Union cannot function. And if we do not criticize Orbán violating treaty values and principles because it might have an impact on the campaign, that has an impact on the campaign.

Just last week, Orbán blocked the EU’s €90 billion loan for Ukraine that it agreed in December. What does that say about the standard of unanimity for foreign policy decisions?

Orbán has used the veto more than any other European leader. So, Orbán single-handedly exposes the biggest flaw of the Union, which is this unanimity principle, which might have many decades ago been [developed] to protect smaller member states from being ignored. But now, it has become a tool for extortion and blackmail, which actually threatens all of our security. If [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's agent in the European Council can single-handedly prevent us from supporting Ukraine or sanctioning Russia, it's a security threat for all of us.

This latest veto is special because Hungary does not participate in this loan, it doesn't affect Hungary, but he still blocks others from helping Ukraine. And that is such a nasty attack that obviously needs to trigger a debate on unanimity. 

In the past, the European Commission and national leaders found ways to bypass Hungary’s veto to avoid political paralysis. Were there other options they could have employed? 

This has been the wrong strategy for quite a long time, because time and again we have seen that either EU measures were weakened or delayed or exemptions were made, such as on the import of Russian oil. The only language that Orbán understands is that of power. Every time you let yourself be blackmailed, you encourage him to do it again and even harder next time. And currently, on the €90 billion support for Ukraine, we're paying the price. Ukrainians are paying the price that member states were not willing to confront. 

How much of a difference could we expect in areas like enlargement, Ukraine, foreign policy, if the Hungarian opposition party wins next month’s elections? Do you think Magyar will prove to be a partner of the EU?

He will be different from Orbán. Luckily, we haven't seen anyone else like Orbán, even people that are maybe ideologically close in their behaviour in the European Council, people like [Robert] Fico or [Andrej] Babiš have been quite different, so I would hope that there is a marked change in that, but we will see.

Member states and the other leaders have ignored the Orbán problem for too long. Now everyone is basically just putting their head in the sand hoping that the election goes well, but they're not adequately preparing the different scenarios that we might be facing. What happens if Orbán doesn't accept the election results? What happens if he just self-declares the winner and [U.S. President Donald] Trump congratulates him without that being the result?

How does the EU then deal with that, and how do they deal with it if Orbán should legitimately win these elections? How the EU and the member states react will be decisive.

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