Romania has begun work on upgrading an airbase to become a major hub for NATO operations, changing the balance of power in the Black Sea theatre that could be pivotal in any future conflicts in the region and beyond.
The Mihail Kogălniceanu Airbase (MKAB), near Constanta Port on the Black Sea, has been associated with NATO operations since 1999. In 2019, Romania’s defence ministry announced plans to upgrade the facility to base advanced fighter jets and drones, as well as hosting up to 10,000 NATO troops, at a cost of €2.5 billion. Work has now begun, Defence Minister Angel Tîlvăr said in June this year.
While the plans pre-date Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the expansion of the base – located just 400km from Sevastopol, the main port in Russian-occupied Crimea – will enhance NATO’s operational capability if its forces ever become engaged in that conflict, and could deter Russia from further escalation.
The base is ideally located to respond to a range of threats that NATO might face, says Oana Popescu-Zamfir, director of the GlobalFocus Center, an independent think tank in Bucharest. “Romania is the only country [bordering the Black Sea] that is both a NATO and EU member well-aligned on foreign policy and security with both organisations,” she says.
“Bulgaria has struggled to fully break free from Russian influence, while Turkey, despite being the most influential NATO player on the Black Sea, plays a complicated game that raises reservations in both the EU and NATO."
MKAB could also be used as a base of operations for other conflicts in the broader region. “With the exception of Turkey, we are the closest to existing and potential theatres of operations,” Popescu-Zamfir says.
“We have just enough time to react if an attack is launched from Crimea, Russia, or a Middle Eastern territory. At the same time, we are close enough to be the first point of departure for flights without needing to refuel in air or on land. This makes us a potential launch pad for defensive operations.”
NATO forces have already begun a show of deterrence: the US Air Force flew two B-52s to the base last month. With a combat range of more than 14,000km, the Cold War strategic bomber can easily reach potential targets across Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East from MKAB.
Balance of power
Diplomatically, NATO’s enhanced ability to project power into the Black Sea could support future NATO access bids for Moldova or for Ukraine itself, since the alliance is more likely to accept a member that it’s confident of being able to defend, experts say.
“Ukraine's aspirations for NATO membership are bolstered by Romania's increasing role in Black Sea security,” says Sebastian Bruns, a researcher at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University in Germany. “For Moldova's security, Romania serves as a key ally, offering comprehensive support.”
Russian officials, who see the expansion of NATO bases as a direct threat to their own security, have recently stepped up their threats of retribution as the project goes ahead.
The larger a NATO base and the “closer it is to Russia's borders, the more likely it is to be among the first targets for retaliatory strikes,” Russian Senator Andrey Klimov said in March, according to news reports. “There won't be any benefit for Romania from this, and there will be more threats; this is a fact.”
This is not the first time Romania has faced Russian threats over security enhancements. In 2016, when Romania installed a US missile defence system at the Deveselu military base, also located on the Black Sea, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the positioning of US missiles in neighbouring countries like Romania would lead to retaliatory measures from Russia.
He emphasised that Russia would respond to any perceived threats to its security and indicated that military countermeasures could be taken against NATO installations in the region. Since then, Russia has not directly escalated military tensions with Romania, but it has continued to strengthen the offensive potential of its Western flank, a process that began in 2015.
Regardless, Romania has been working to strengthen its military capabilities: it has allocated a record-breaking €19 billion to its defence budget in 2024, at least 20 percent of which is focused on acquiring modern equipment, exceeding NATO's spending target of 2 percent of GDP.
“Romania is not defined by the strength and health of its finances and economy, or by rigorously following democratic principles and the rule of law, but it is recognised as a security player,” says Popescu-Zamfir. “It is seen as a country that understands regional security and has been very constructive in both the EU and NATO.”
Nevertheless, Bruns suggested it may take the next generation of leaders for Romania to be fully accepted as military peers and political heavyweights within NATO and the EU. He further highlighted that NATO as an organisation is also in a process of changing its priorities.
“For 20 years, NATO was primarily focused on Afghanistan. Only in the past four or five years, especially after 2022, has it refocused on the strategic importance of aircraft and naval bases in different parts of the world,” he said, referring to a buildup in Eastern Europe following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian threats
While a direct military confrontation between Russia and a NATO member country remains an extreme scenario, Romanian experts warn that Russia could attempt to destabilise the country in other ways, particularly in the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December of this year, respectively.
Russia’s actions could range from “support for all anti-West, anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-EU sentiments, to weaponising social tensions and political polarisation in Romania,” says Ionela Maria Ciolan, a security researcher at the Martens Centre in Brussels.
There have already been allegations in Romania, as in other European countries, that Russia is working with far-right parties to try to destabilise society. Anatol Salaru, a former defence minister of neighbouring Moldova, said last year that his country’s intelligence agency had told him about meetings between a Russian FSB agent and George Simion, the lead of Romania’s far-right AUR party, in 2015. Simion has denied the allegation.
Ciolan believes that a newer far-right party, S.O.S. Romania, has “links with Russia, as leader Diana Sosoaca attended various meetings and events organised by the Russian Embassy in Bucharest during her previous mandate as Romanian parliament member.”
Russia’s interference efforts could intensify in the run-up to this year’s elections. The presidential election will mark a transition of power, as President Klaus Iohannis has reached his term limit. With less than four months to go, uncertainty remains high as candidates have yet to be announced.
But experts say they’re unlikely to succeed because NATO and security isn’t a wedge issue: Romanians across the spectrum broadly agree on the current approach.
“When it comes to foreign policy and security options, there's a cross-cutting consensus that Romania has only one viable path: to align as closely as possible with the EU and NATO,” says Popescu-Zamfir. “All parties, especially major ones, have consistently signalled their understanding that Romania needs to contribute to regional security to prevent immediate repercussions for the country.”
Regardless of the election outcome, Bruns believes that MKAB’s expansion will put Romania’s next president on a good diplomatic footing, bolstering its commitment to NATO under the next government.
“The base will always give the next Romanian president grounds for discussions with the American president and NATO's Secretary General in Brussels, Mark Rutte,” he says. “And the base will be there, it will not go away – at least for the foreseeable future.”