Last Friday, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled the contents of the 19th sanctions package against Russia — labelled the one that will “bring Putin to the negotiating table.”
To draft the proposal, the Commission sent a delegation led by sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan to Washington, seeking US President Donald Trump’s backing for tougher measures.
As expected, the package focuses on Russian fossil-fuel revenues, including an accelerated phase-out of liquified natural gas by the end of 2026 — a year earlier than previously planned. It also targets third-country firms, including Chinese companies, accused of aiding Russia’s evasion of sanctions.
In her speech, Von der Leyen announced additional financial measures hitting crypto platforms, as well as a parallel plan-in-the-making to use frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s defence — a proposal met with skepticism from ECB President Christine Lagarde.
Before it can take effect, the proposal must win unanimous approval in the European Council on 23 October. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, still heavily reliant on Russian energy and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief ally in the EU, is expected to threaten a veto to water down the content.
The Parliament spoke to Kinga Redlowska, head of the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI Europe, to learn more about the strengths and weaknesses of the Commission's latest sanctions package.
This interview has been edited for clarity.
What's in the 19th package?
The package offers several new sanctions or expansions. It includes a full ban on Russian LNG, but with a delay in full imposition until January 2027. It includes further financial sanctions on Russian financial institutions operating outside of Russia, but also designations in third countries. It also expands the list of dual-use goods and the list of sanctioned vessels.
How is this new package different from the previous ones?
It's not that much different. And I think it's a problem. Fundamentally, the Commission is not looking for more innovative, smarter approaches to sanction Russia. It just builds on solutions introduced in previous packages. It’s unwilling to leave the comfort zone and be more muscular in its deployment of sanctions tools.
How well have the sanctions against Russia worked until now?
To answer that question, it's very important to underline a certain moment in time. It's a constant tug of war between the G7 countries and Russia. Each new sanction package triggers responses from the Kremlin and circumvention. It's a constant fight, and I would say as we speak in September 2025, on the eve of adoption of the 19th package, the EU is losing, because it doesn't want to deploy the tools that should be the starting point of an effective sanctions regime.
What would be some effective tools?
There are three things that the EU should move forward with. First, the EU should stop buying energy from Russia, full stop. Second, the EU should confiscate Russian frozen assets. And third, the EU should start imposing secondary sanctions. On the third point, the EU has over the last several packages started to expand its listings and anti-circumvention measures targeting third countries. But that's not enough. The EU needs to follow the US and be tougher on designation of secondary sanctions.
Washington played a role in drafting this package, especially the phase-out of Russian fossil-fuel supplies. What consequences can we expect for the EU, for Russia and for the US?
The delay on LNG ban can backfire. It won't take effect until January 2027. Long delays give Russia time to adapt, find new markets and reorganise. There's also the risk of buyers, including European countries and entities, stockpiling in the short term — paradoxically boosting Russian revenues. Take fertilisers: a phased-out import ban initially triggered stockpiling and even higher revenues for Moscow. Whether the same dynamic plays out with LNG remains to be seen. Energy is, of course, a more complex issue - but the parallel is hard to ignore.
Hungary and Slovakia still depend on Russian fossil fuel supplies. Is the EU ready for this phase-out or could Russian supplies still be too critical for these countries?
We are discussing this issue more than three and a half years into the conflict. I think all the countries have had enough time to reorganise their supply chains and energy mix. It’s no secret those two countries are playing the sanctions file to gain leverage with the European Commission. The EU, member states and the Commission need to engage with them on this topic.
The proposal needs Council approval. Given Viktor Orbán’s past resistance, do you expect changes to secure unanimity?
It's difficult to comment on this, because it all refers to political negotiations and has nothing to do with the effectiveness of sanctions per se. Countries are using sanctions to promote their political agenda. We often speak about Slovakia and Hungary, but we don't speak enough about other countries effectively blocking, for example, confiscation of Russian frozen assets. And these countries are Belgium — that is benefiting from hosting the clearing agency EuroClear and from the taxation on the income — and France, that is drowning in a budget gap and fire-selling the debt.
Von der Leyen has proposed using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine’s defence, a move opposed by ECB chief Christine Lagarde. What exactly is the plan, and what risks does it carry?
In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen said the assets themselves will not be touched, effectively ruling out confiscation. This weakens the EU's and Ukraine's negotiating leverage and frankly removes Ukraine's benefit of the doubt, which is harmful to both Ukraine and the EU. I cannot imagine the motivations of making such a declaration in the State of the Union.
The proposal to create a new financial vehicle to invest Russian assets into more risky programmes is something the Centre for Finance and Security has been calling for a long time. But commentators and leaders alike cherry-pick their arguments — whether to oppose outright confiscation or to resist putting the frozen assets into a more aggressive investment plan. For example, President Macron, in his statement yesterday, pointed to confiscation being in breach of international law. Yet renowned professors from across countries have issued legal commentary framing confiscation as a legitimate countermeasure.
What are the risks apart from the fact that some countries would lose out on taxation of these assets?
Frankly, I cannot think of any. Some, especially Germany and France, alongside Christine Lagarde, suggest it will threaten the stability of the Eurozone. But the most sensitive moment of the actual freezing of those assets did not cause any disturbance in the European market. So there is no reason to think that, after more than three and a half years of debate, either outright confiscation or channeling the frozen assets into a more aggressive investment programme would trigger a seismic shift in how investors view the Eurozone. And fundamentally, if regimes preparing to wage an illegal war of aggression no longer see Europe as a safe haven for their reserves, that is hardly a loss. However Europe chooses to act on the frozen Russian assets, the Eurozone remains among the world’s most stable and reliable investment spaces.
For the first time, the Commission mentioned prohibiting cryptocurrencies currently used by Russia to evade sanctions on banks. How can that be done?
Indeed, this is a very important aspect. Governments should upscale enforcement of sanctions and also track the procurement of dual-use goods via crypto. Paradoxically, enforcement is not as hard as it seems: once you identify a wallet, all its blockchain transactions are publicly visible. But to enforce those sanctions more systemically, governments should engage more with the broader crypto community — especially the blockchain analytics companies tasked with monitoring compliance. We need to look closely at how these companies operate and hold them to account.
Sanctions on Russia and China boost US defence and energy. Is this package more about Trump’s agenda than pressuring Putin to negotiate?
It's true that Donald Trump was the one who said that the EU needs to stop buying Russian energy, confiscate Russian assets, and impose secondary sanctions. But framing effective sanctions on Russia as serving only US interests reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. Russia is a direct threat to European, not American, security.
The biggest obstacle in making EU sanctions effective is poor enforcement. Eighteen out of 27 member states have not transposed the directive on criminalisation of sanctions violation. In 2022, the Commission created the Sanctions Enforcement Coordination Mechanism to improve reporting, but it’s still patchy. Many member states either under-report or don't systemically share information on breaches, penalties and investigations.
Commission rhetoric like unprecedented, tough, and hard-biting creates a narrative that sanctions are crippling Russia, while in practice enforcement is patchy, timelines are delayed and loopholes remain. When citizens see Russia still financing its war through energy exports, including to European countries, trust is eroded. It’s time for the Commission to work more closely with member states to ensure sanctions are effectively implemented, to make better use of the tools already at its disposal, and to be more transparent with the public about how enforcement actually works — rather than continually debating the next package that mostly adds to an already long list of dual-use goods, sanctioned entities, and individuals.
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