On May 9, citizens across the European Union celebrated Europe Day, commemorating the 76th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, a 1950 proposal widely viewed as the starting point of the modern EU.
But this year’s celebration comes at a tenuous moment for the bloc, as Washington’s decades-long support for European integration withers away under U.S. President Donald Trump.
In an interview with The Parliament, Belgian political scientist Steven Van Hecke reflected on the history of European integration since 1945, arguing that Europe is now entering a third phase defined by the pursuit of strategic autonomy from the United States.
Van Hecke, author of Why Europe? and Brave Old Continent?, said that while Europe’s integration project faces mounting short-term pressures as national politicians struggle to take bold collective action, he remains optimistic about the EU’s long-term future.
“The core to European integration today is the ‘European way of life,’” he said, emphasizing the bloc’s blend of the rule of law and social market democracy. “That is what makes the EU attractive for its own citizens and also explains why so many countries want to join.”
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Since the Schuman Declaration in 1950, Europe has come a long way towards integration. Now after a long pause since the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, how is this latest phase of European integration different from past ones?
We are in the third phase of European integration. The first phase starts with the Cold War, with coal and steel. Normally, we would have jumped from coal to steel, the sources of war, to the soldiers itself. But on August 13, 1954, the French said no to European common defense. That meant the security question was outsourced to the United States and from coal and steel we jumped to the economy.
That first phase finished with the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification and the implosion of the Soviet Union. Then started the second phase, the deepening of the EU, an economic and monetary union and enlargement towards the East. This second phase brought us a lot of prosperity and development.
We are now in the third phase. Trump’s election in 2016 in part triggers this new era, and his attitude toward Europe. Trump’s second term is crucial to increase the momentum in this third phase as far as security is concerned, and for European countries that are still dependent on the U.S. to realize that they cannot trust their ally anymore.
The EU has a lot of great strategies for this third phase. We know what to do in the long term, but European leaders are unable to make short-term decisions. That’s the threat of this third phase for Europe.
Initially, European integration was something akin to a post-war peace project. What is the core of European integration today?
The core to European integration today is the ‘European way of life.’ That is what makes the EU attractive for its own citizens and also explains why so many countries want to join. It also explains why the waiting room for Russia is empty, the waiting room for China is empty, and even the waiting room for the U.S. is empty.
EU membership is a very low-cost assurance against total irrelevance in the world. Alone, every single European country does not matter in this world. They can only try to limit their irrelevance by doing it together. The other, more positive dimension is the ‘European way of life,’ the model we have developed since World War II. It's the rule of law and democracy combined with a social market economy.
It's not perfect and a lot of people still are unhappy in our current societies. But the combination of individual liberties with social welfare is very attractive. So I would not link the core of European integration today to religion, culture or anything else. You combine individual liberties with a high level of social welfare, which is actually also what Konrad Adenauer stood for, what the EU’s founding fathers stood for, and has been very successfully developed in the decades since.
Recent surveys show that upwards of ¾ of Europeans are calling for a common foreign policy, common trade policy and common defense and security policy. And yet, European leaders are not seriously considering the treaty reform needed to make that a reality. Why?
I think the popular support for the European integration project is now bigger than at the start, because we have Brexit, we see Trump, we see China, we see Russia. Why does it not lead to the kind of Europe that people want? It’s because we expect national politicians to act European. You would never expect this in another democratic system. That means that for every area you need to have majorities in the member states and in the European Parliament.
The problem is the member states. Why do we expect national leaders, who are held accountable nationally, to make tough European decisions? Can you blame Friedrich Merz for thinking about how to win the next elections? After all, he's the Chancellor of Germany. He's not the Chancellor of Europe, so that is very difficult.
What you need is a European Commission that is more bold and daring, but we have Ursula von der Leyen. She comes from the same party as Merz. From Germany’s perspective, it was a great choice for Von der Leyen to become the president of the European Commission. But it's a disadvantage that we have a Commission President from a large country like Germany.
How should the European Union be thinking about enlargement right now?
What is new to enlargement is the security dimension. This was not the case in the previous rounds, because there was no threat. Security unites Ukraine and Moldova together with the countries of the Western Balkans. The goal should be to get rid of foreign powers. I'm a guest lecturer in Sarajevo. I was there last December. I was jogging and I saw a new building of the library of the University of Sarajevo. It was funded by Saudi Arabia. You have the Chinese, you have the Turkish, you have the Russians, you have the Gulf states in the Western Balkans. This is unacceptable.
Is turning the EU into a military organization with a security guarantee viable? Or will defense always be the province of an organization like NATO?
This is a problem that you cannot bore average citizens of the EU with. This is a question of operationalization of defensive sovereignty. Is it possible to have an autonomous defense capacity within NATO? If yes, attempt it. If it's not possible, then we do it outside of NATO, and then it will be up to the member states to decide how to form that organization.
What would your vision be?
I’m calling for a new European defense community. It would be an international treaty that the European Commission can start and it would include Ukraine along with other European countries. It’s European countries joining the Ukrainian army to become a European army. If there would ever be a ceasefire in Ukraine, you have a lot of trained soldiers. In five or ten years, Ukraine can become a member of the EU. But let's not wait. We can already start with a true European defense community now.
What role has the U.S. historically played in European integration, and how has Trump’s policy toward the EU today changed that role?
Part of the third phase of European integration is defined by losing the U.S. as an ally. All U.S. presidents since World War II, whether Democrats or Republicans, have supported the European integration project. Trump is the exception.
That has had an enormous psychological effect. The issue now is whether we are able to regain our sovereignty, which is another way of saying, ‘Are we strategically autonomous?’ It doesn't necessarily mean independent. It means when decisions need to be made in your interest, you are able to make your own decisions and you are willing to pay the price for it. And that is what is lacking.
As we've discussed, the EU has many possible strategies to counter the challenges of this third period of integration, but a lack of short-term action. Why is that?
The problem is structural, because we expect national leaders to act European. These national leaders are also in a more difficult situation than previous generations. The margin that Merz has is tiny compared to the margin that Helmut Kohl had. That, of course, triggers risk aversive behavior among politicians. It's very risky for them to stand up for Europe, much more so than previous generations. To change that risk aversion we need even more external pressure on Europe. It's a pity to say, but Brexit and Trump I were not enough, and even the full scale invasion of Ukraine was not enough. It hopefully is with Trump II.
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