Mediterranean EU countries are sounding the alarm in Brussels over accelerating migration flows from Libya, with some suggesting that growing Russian influence in the divided country could be to blame.
Not everyone is convinced that Russia’s presence is related to growing migration from the North African country, with some analysts pointing out that both are long-term trends. But with migration high on the political agenda across Europe, EU leaders are increasingly concerned about Libya.
Italy, France, Greece and Malta raised the situation in Libya at a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels last month, arguing that escalating clashes between rival armed factions were leading to increased irregular migrant crossings along the Central Mediterranean route.
The route — running from Libya and Tunisia to Italy and Malta — is becoming more of a pressure point in Europe’s migration debates. While overall irregular entries into the EU dropped by 20% in the first half of 2025 compared to the same period last year, crossings from North Africa rose 12% year on year and now account for 39% of total irregular arrivals, according to data from EU border control agency Frontex.
“Immigration is the first problem for a country like Italy because Italy is the door for Europe. For all of Europe,” said Daniele Ruvinetti, a senior advisor at Italy’s Med-Or Foundation. “It can then become a problem not only for Italy, but for all of Europe. From Italy, they then can go in France, in Belgium, in Germany.”
Russia’s Libya play alarms EU
Libya has been unstable or in civil war since the death of former dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The country is currently split between two major factions, with the internationally recognised government controlling the west, including the capital Tripoli, and a faction led by General Khalifa Haftar controlling the east from the city of Benghazi.
Russia is among many outside actors to play a role in the conflict, selling weapons and allegedly giving direct military assistance to Haftar. This year’s parade of Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), held last month, showcased hundreds of Russian armoured vehicles and air defence systems.
After the fall of its ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria, there is some evidence that Russia may be switching the main focus of its Mediterranean operations to Benghazi. Earlier this year, there were indications that equipment evacuated from Russia’s bases in Syria, including the port of Tartus, was heading to Libya. An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists this year found that Russia’s ‘ghost fleet’ was likely to be transferring weapons to Haftar.
As Russia’s influence in Libya grows, some in Europe suspect that it could attempt to increase migration flows as a way to destabilise EU countries — much as it has done at the border between its client state Belarus and Poland. The tactic, which involves facilitating irregular crossings across the border into the EU, is designed to destabilise national governments and boost support for anti-immigration parties in Europe, which are already on the rise across Europe — many of which are more friendly to Moscow.
At a summit for northern and southern EU countries in Finland late last year, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni urged the EU to do more to protect its borders and not let Russia or any "criminal organisation" control the flows of illegal migrants into the bloc.
In an interview with Politico this week, Magnus Brunner, the European Commissioner for migration, warned that Europe must be prepared to negotiate with Haftar to avoid further “weaponisation” of migration by Russia. “There is certainly a danger that Russia … [will] use migrants and the migration issue as a whole as a weapon against Europe,” he said.
Questions over Moscow’s role in migration
But some analysts are sceptical of this framing. “It’s true that there is an influx of more migrants [from Libya], but it’s not the Russians,” Karim Mezran, director of the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council, told The Parliament. “The Russians don’t give a heck about that. They’re going to let the Libyan clans manage their immigration rackets.”
Bram Frouws, director of the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), also said Haftar’s militia had reasons of its own to manipulate migration flows, without needing orders from Moscow. “This is a way to be engaged in diplomatic talks. And then simply make money as well because they're involved in both smuggling and interception,” he said. “Migration is sort of one way in which they can fight over who gets Europe's approval.”
Moreover, Haftar’s faction is tied up in a dispute with Greece over maritime borders, and may be encouraging a greater flow of migrants towards Greek islands as a way of exerting diplomatic pressure.
“There's no doubt there's a direct linkage between the geopolitical tensions of the moment — between Greece and eastern Libya — and the arrival of several thousand people to Gavdos and Crete,” said Claudia Gazzini, senior Libya analyst at the International Crisis Group.
“I don't buy into this idea that the Russians are behind all of this,” she said. “They don't need to be, because this is a pattern of Libyan behaviour that goes back to the Gaddafi days.”
Europe’s loss of influence in Africa
Recent developments have highlighted Europe’s lack of influence in Libya. Commissioner Brunner, travelled to Benghazi with ministers from Italy, Greece, and Malta to open talks with Haftar earlier this month. But he was immediately blindsided when Haftar brough two officials from his rival Government of National Stability to the airport without prior warning. After refusing to be photographed with them — tantamount to an official EU recognition of the administration — Haftar evicted Brunner and other European officials.
At the same time, France’s declining military footprint in North and West Africa underscores Europe’s waning influence across the region. France last week completed its military withdrawal from Senegal — the last West African country where it had a permanent troop presence. That follows earlier pullouts from Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and the Ivory Coast, where military-led governments have increasingly aligned themselves with Moscow over their former colonial overlord.
“France has been kicked out, badly,” said Mezran. “The French are very big losers in the region.”
Divisions between EU member states are also preventing the emergence of a unified approach. France is receptive towards Haftar, and hosted him at the Élysée Palace as recently as February. Italy, by contrast, is a strong backer of the internationally recognised government in Tripoli; Meloni has made four official trips to the country.
“The problem is the history,” said Ruvinetti. “France was always close to Haftar, and Italy of course is close to Tripoli. I don’t see Europe as strong in this contest. When you talk about Libya, you talk Russia, Turkey, Emirates, Egypt.”
Sign up to The Parliament's weekly newsletter
Every Friday our editorial team goes behind the headlines to offer insight and analysis on the key stories driving the EU agenda. Subscribe for free here.